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South/South East Asia region in the recent past. Left unchecked, these developments can 
have significant implications for the Global War on Terror. Third World countries have 
inherited many attributes from their colonial past which make them susceptible to 
insurgency. These factors, which are typical of the Third World, limit even the capacity 
of democratic states to mitigate divisive tendencies. This paper analyzes the susceptibility 
of Third World countries to insurgency and develops a theoretical perspective to 
illuminate some of the factors contributing to insurgency in these countries. A simple 
linear model for India is developed, based on the hypothesis that the degree of 
inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social identity of its population, and the 
amount of external unifying influence on the area determine the propensity of that area 
for insurgency. The model is empirically verified for the entire country by comparing 
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Problem: There has been a resurgence of indigenous Maoist insurgencies in 
the South/South East Asia region in the recent past. Left unchecked, these destabilizing 
developments can have significant implications for the Global War on Terror.  
Researcher William Latimer (2004), suggests that the United States in its global counter-
terrorism campaign must draw on the experience of India, which has an extensive history 
of counterterrorism efforts.  
About India:  India is a union of states. The Constitution of India provides for a 
parliamentary form of government, federal in structure with certain unitary features. The 
Constitution of India distributes legislative powers between parliament (national level) 
and legislative assemblies (state level). Apart from the states, there are centrally 
administered territories, called Union Territories. 
According to the Indian federal structure, the fighting of insurgency at home is the 
responsibility of the concerned state government. This accounts for the diversity and 
inconsistencies in the Indian approach to counterinsurgency. However, there has been 
also a broad evolution of counterinsurgency strategy over the years because of 
involvement of the central (federal) government, army, central (federal) police 
organizations, Indian Police Service, Indian Administrative Service, and the linkages 
between provincial and central politics in counterinsurgency by state governments. A list 
of major insurgencies faced by India since independence in 1947 is shown below. 
 




Period 1980-on 1979-on 1978-96 1947- on 1980- on 1966- 
1976 



















Religious √  √      
Ethnic  √  √ √ √  √ 
Ideology    √  √ √ √ 
Nature of 
Insurgency 
Linguistic  √       
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Objective of The Study: The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical 
perspective for analyzing the Indian experience with insurgency, and to discuss its 
implications for counterinsurgency in Third World countries.   
Literature Review and Conceptual Discussions: Understanding the affected 
population is essential for understanding an insurgency or planning for 
counterinsurgency. The contested population is not only the end; it is also an important 
means for the insurgent. The insurgents and government of the day contest with one 
another to control the population as well as to gain the populace’s loyalty.  
Skocpol(1994) holds that the probability of revolution against the state is 
determined by the degree of penetration of national territory by a state, the incorporation 
of socially mobilized groups, and the degree of bureaucratization of the state 
administration and its armed forces (p.273). India, with a history of democratic 
governance for more than fifty years, should ideally score high on all three dimensions. 
True to the model, at the macro level, India has been able to handle the many 
insurgencies it has faced since independence from the British Empire in 1947. However, 
this does not explain the emergence of insurgencies at various areas within India. The 
reasons for these insurgencies can be traced to the many attributes of the country which, 
like many other Third World societies, affect all the three dimensions of Skocpol’s 
model. Based on these aspects, a slightly different model is developed. 
Hypotheses, Scope and Methodology: Based on scholarly works by many 
authors from various disciplines, I advance the following hypothesis. 
In India, the degree of inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social 
identity of its population, and the amount of external unifying influence on it, determine 
the propensity of that area for insurgency. 
To test this hypothesis, I examine all the major insurgencies in India since 
independence. A simple model is developed to explain the emergence and strength of 
insurgencies in India. Secondary and tertiary sources are used for collating data to test the 
model. 
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The Model: Based on the above hypothesis, the relationship between the 
variables can be expressed by the following equation.   
I =CxrelXrel  + CxlangXlang + CxethnXeth + CyforYfor  + CyslopeYslope + CzZ + I0 
I0 is the value of I when all the other factors on the right-hand side are 0, 
Xrel is the SSI due to religion.  
Xlang is the SSI due to language.  
Xethn is the SSI due to ethnicity.  
Yfor is the average forest coverage of an area. 
Yslope is the average slope of the terrain of an area.  
Cxrel, Cxlang, Cxethn, Cyfor, Cyslope, and Cz are the coefficients. 
SSI (The Strength of Separate Social Identity): Can be defined as the sense of 
separation from majority population through religion, language, ethnicity, and 
any other distinct social attribute of the population as a whole. 
I (Propensity for Insurgency): This is the dependent variable. It is defined as 
the level of insurgency seen in the past in an area.  
Z (The Amount of External Unifying Influence): Is defined as the proportion of 
persons among the top leadership of the main insurgent groups who are of 
outside origin or who spend a lot of their time outside the affected area. 
Because of unavailability of data, only the X and Y dimensions of the model have 
been empirically verified for the entire country by comparing data from India’s 528 
parliamentary constituencies, while the Z dimension is supported by empirical evidence. 
For verification by correlation, both the graphical method as well as the analytical 
method is used. For this, ArcGIS software and statistical tools are used for analyzing 
geographic data and for finding the strength of correlation through regression analysis.  
Conclusions and Recommendations: Acceptance of the model has significant 
policy implications for the Third World countries, regarding the role of democracy, the 
desirability and extent of decentralization of political power, the desirability and type of 
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economic development with respect to the ground situation, integration of the population, 
and the effect of forest on counterinsurgency. The following recommendations are made, 
based on these discussions: 
1. Economic development of inaccessible and hitherto economically 
unviable areas should be fostered by the state. Careful considerations 
should be undertaken regarding the likely outcome of the governmental 
efforts, particularly in the areas already dominated by the insurgents and in 
the areas inhabited by relatively isolated tribes. 
2. Democratic decentralization, within the broad legal structure based on 
equality and human rights, should be adopted to politically mobilize the 
marginal population in the right direction. 
3. Outside influences inciting the insurgency should be denied access to 
vulnerable areas by constructing physical barriers.  
4. The structure of force and hardware for counterinsurgency operations 





I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Problem  
In the recent past, Maoist insurgency in Nepal has caught international attention 
with spectacular violent incidents in the Himalayan state. More and more areas of Nepal 
may fall into lawlessness, which in turn may offer safe haven for smugglers, poachers, 
drug traffickers and terrorists. There has been a similar resurgence of Maoist insurgency 
in India and the Philippines without any apparent support from any communist country. 
What effect all these developments might have on the Global War on Terror should be a 
matter of great concern and immediate attention. 
Researcher William Latimer (2004), suggests that “as the United States embarks 
on its global counter-terrorism campaign, it must draw on the experience of other 
countries. Specifically India, with an extensive history of counterterrorism efforts, can 
reveal important lessons applicable to America’s endeavors”(p.v).  
2. About India 
India is a union of states.  It is governed under the terms of the Constitution of 
India, which came into force on January 26, 1950. The Constitution provides for a 
parliamentary form of government, federal in structure with certain unitary features.  The 
constitutional head of the union is the President.  The parliament of the union consists of 
the President and two houses known as the Council of States and the House of the 
People. The real executive power of the union is vested in the Council of Ministers 
headed by the Prime Minister of India. The Council of Ministers is collectively 
responsible to the House of the People (Constitution of india.).  
Similarly, at the level of state government, the Council of the Ministers of a state, 
headed by a Chief Minister, is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of 
that state. The Constitution of India distributes legislative powers between Parliament and 
states. Apart from the states, there are centrally administered territories, called Union 
Territories.  
2 
It may be worthwhile to briefly discuss certain trends in the evolution of Indian 
society. The Indian subcontinent, until its colonization by the British, had witnessed 
many invasions. The conquerors either left after sacking and looting the inhabitants, or 
made India their new home.  If the conquering tribe or people decided to settle down, 
then those who were defeated had two choices. They either accepted an inferior position 
in the conqueror's society, or they left their land and fled to more inaccessible and less 
economically viable areas within the subcontinent.  
Sometimes another invading tribe might again conquer the economically viable 
land and push the earlier conquerors to less viable areas. For example, the Bodo Cachhar 
tribes from the east settled in the fertile valley of Brahmaputra river sometimes in third or 
fourth century AD, pushing the original inhabitants into higher mountainous terrain. Then 
after a few hundred years, the Ahom tribes came from the east and pushed the Bodo 
Cachhars into the southern hilly areas.     
Areas with forest cover and hilly terrain generally provided the inaccessible 
refuges for the vanquished. However, over the ages, the relative inaccessibility of vast 
areas changed. With the adoption of iron implements, thick forests were cut down for 
conversion to agricultural land. Road construction also decreased the inaccessibility of 
these areas. After colonization, the British constructed railroads for accessing new areas 
for mining and plantation.  
Those who inhabited the inaccessible areas generally remained marginalized and 
were identified as tribesmen by the more complex societies which developed on the 
fertile irrigated lands. For example, the Bodos remained relatively isolated compared to 
the Ahoms, who developed economically and politically and ultimately were integrated 
into the complex Hindu society of the Aryans which had developed elsewhere on the 
subcontinent. 
However, the situation has never been completely stable. There have been 
dynamic political, economic, and social interactions among the greater civilizations and 
the "little traditions." Dynamism was introduced sometimes through change in 
technology, sometimes through social and religious reforms, sometimes through change  
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in economic activities and yet other times through political conquest. Thus the 
marginalized societies remained at various levels of isolation from or integration with the 
greater socio-political system.  
Over the years and after independence, the position as well as the ambitions of 
these societies has changed. After 50 years of democratic governance, it is difficult to 
identify some of them as separate from the mainstream, while others can still be called 
tribesmen in the real sense. The impact of democracy and modern economic development 
has been different for different populations. For example, because of the quality of the 
land and its inaccessibility, a particular area may be less viable for modern economic 
development. However, the inhabitants of that area, with emotional attachments to the 
land of their ancestors, will not migrate to a more viable area. Therefore, many of them 
continue to remain on the fringes of the economic and political system. 
The government of India has been trying to stimulate development in these areas. 
Since the actual governance of an area, as specified in the Indian Constitution, is left to 
the democratically elected provincial government, there is wide variation in the impact of 
democratic development on these societies.  
An easy way to describe today’s India would be by comparison to the European 
Union. If the European Union is able to achieve greater integration through single 
currency, similarity in legal and administrative structures, unified security and foreign 
affairs management, and a sense of patriotic loyalty to the Union among the citizens of 
member nations, then the European Union will closely resemble India. The Indian 
constitution recognizes 23 official languages while European Union has 20 official 
languages (Encyclopedia: European languages.; Encyclopedia: India.). The official 
figure of "mother tongues" spoken in India is 1,683, of which an estimated 850 are in 
daily use. The SIL Ethnologue lists 387 living languages for India (Encyclopedia: Indian 
languages.2005). The social, cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity of India surpasses 
that of the European Union.  
Another way to describe India is by contrast with the United States. If the US 
society resembles a bag of multigrain rice in which diversity is visible but more or less 
uniformly dispersed, Indian diversity is visible like plums in a pudding.   
4 
Fighting insurgency has been a homeland problem for India. According to the 
Indian federal structure, the fighting of insurgency is a provincial responsibility. 
Therefore, depending on the local political situation, fluctuating and divergent 
counterinsurgency strategies are adopted in India. This accounts for the diversity of 
approach and different levels of success in counterinsurgency since India’s independence 
in 1947. However, in spite of this diversity and inconsistency, there has been also a broad 
evolution of counterinsurgency strategy over the years because of involvement of the 
central (federal) government, army, central police organizations, Indian Police Service, 
Indian Administrative Service, and the linkages between provincial and central politics in 
counterinsurgency by state governments. A list of major insurgencies faced by India 
since independence in 1947 is shown below. 
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B. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical perspective for analyzing 
the Indian experience with insurgency, and to discuss its implications for 
counterinsurgency in Third World countries.  This thesis postulates that the strength of an 
insurgency and the success of the counterinsurgency strategy are the dependent variables, 
and factors like the inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social identity, and 
external influences are important independent variables. The role of relevant independent 
variables in deciding successful counterinsurgency strategy is discussed in the section 
containing recommendations.  
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSIONS 
1. Insurgency and Affected Population 
Understanding the affected population is essential for understanding an 
insurgency or planning for counterinsurgency. The Marine Corps' Small Wars/21st 
Century (2005) cites Bernard Brodie's War and Politics as stating that "good strategy 
presumes good anthropology and good sociology," and "some of the greatest military 
blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department” (Brodie, 
1973. p.332). The Marine Corps goes on to note that, 
Fundamentally, war involves an iterative competition between peoples or 
societies.  This combination of national history, myth, geography, beliefs, 
ethnic backgrounds and religion we know as culture…. The nature of 
Small Wars places a premium on an in-depth knowledge of a nation’s or 
people’s strategic culture—but more importantly its societal culture. 
(SMALL wars/ 21st century2005. p.25) 
Blind application of conventional military doctrine can be the best recipe for 
failure. According to Leites and Wolfe(1970), “the military measures, forces, and 
capabilities that are best suited for counter insurgency are apt to differ from those that are 
best suited for other types of contingencies” (p.74). Application of conventional strategy 
in an insurgency situation is bound to alienate the affected population and provide the 
insurgent the advantage of propaganda. Krepinevich (1986) describes how the absence of 
“an innovative counterinsurgency strategy alienated the population and provided the 
enemy with an excellent source of propaganda” in Vietnam (p.198). In insurgency, the 
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components of the Clausewitzian trinity (Van Creveld, Martin L., 1999, p.42) lose their 
distinction. Eckstein (1964) points out that “[the] tripartite distinction between 
combatant, noncombatant, and support/supply system is typically blurred in guerrilla war, 
unlike conventional war” (p.83). According to van Creveld (1991), low intensity conflicts 
(LIC) very rarely “involve regular armies on both sides, though often it is a question of 
regulars on one side fighting guerrillas, terrorists, and even civilians, including woman 
and children, on the other” (p.20). In guerrilla warfare “in the classical sense, the ‘people 
sea’ forms a sanctuary of people support for the ‘guerrilla fish’; in urban guerrilla warfare 
the anonymity of the city provides protection” (Mack, 1974, p.177). 
Leites and Wolf (1970) describe insurgency as a system, and population as one of 
its important source of inputs (pp.150-151). The contested population is not only the end; 
it is also an important means for the insurgent. The insurgents and government of the day 
contest with one another to control the population as well as to gain their loyalty. 
Therefore, proper understanding of the contested population in a particular insurgency is 
absolutely necessary for deciding appropriate strategy for tackling it. 
2. Susceptibility of Population to Insurgency  
Skocpol(1994) holds that the probability of revolution against the state is 
determined by the degree of penetration of national territory by a state, the incorporation 
of socially mobilized groups, and the degree of bureaucratization of the state 
administration and its armed forces (p.273). This can be represented by the following 
diagram. 
 
 Revolution least likely 
Exclusionary     Inclusionary 
 
Penetration 












Figure 1.   Skocpol’s Model 
 
3. Adapting Skocpol's Model to India 
India, with a history of democratic governance for more than fifty years, should 
ideally score high on all three dimensions. True to the model, at the macro level, India 
has been able to handle the many insurgencies it has faced since independence from the 
British Empire in 1947. However, this does not explain the emergence of insurgencies at 
various areas within India. The reasons for these insurgencies can be traced to the many 
attributes of the country which, like many other Third World societies, affect all the three 
dimensions of Skocpol’s model. Based on these aspects, a slightly different model is 
developed in the next chapter, which includes dimensions that are easier to estimate.  
4. Social Control and Penetration  
The first consideration is the degree of penetration of national territory by the 
state, which depends on both the reach of the administration as well as the nature and 
quality of governance. Every population has mechanisms for social control. According to 
Johnson (1966), “Society, conceived as the successful adaptation of a collectivity of 
people to their environment through a division of labor, can not succeed unless some 
8 
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people have power over other people” (p.19). Quoting Weber, he describes “[a] state as a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of physical force within a 
given territory” (p.19). He further adds, “Every society needs institutions authorized to 
exercise force [for social control], occasionally, in order to establish confidence. The 
most typical form of this institution is the state” (p.30). Therefore, penetration of a state 
into a population implies social control by the state over the individual members of that 
population. 
5. Fragmented Social Control in the Third World 
Unlike the Western world, Third World countries, for the most part, have not 
evolved into modern nation states on their own. Western society slowly evolved from 
medieval to modern over hundreds of years. According to Tilly (1985), “looking back, 
one cannot help but be struck by the seemingly symbiotic relationship existing between 
the state, military power, and the private economy’s efficiency in the age of 
absolutism”(p.179). All the subsystems reinforced each others’ transformation into 
modern industrialized societies. This did not happen in the case of the Third World 
countries. According to Migdal (1988), Third World states are weak and are not able to 
provide satisfactory enforcement of the laws they promulgate. Many Third World 
countries “have differed from those of both the West and the socialist bloc, not so much 
in the amount of social control in the society but in its distribution and its 
centralization”(p.34). Third World countries, with web-like societies, have “[fragmented] 
social control dispersed among various social organizations having their own rules rather 
than centralized in the state or organizations authorized by the state” (p.40). At the time 
of its independence, Indian society did not resemble a feudal society, nor did it have a 
modern state. According to Kuppuswamy(1960), 
Conflicts at the cultural level and between social norms have been 
responsible for the large scale sense of frustration in the country [India]. 
Democracy, socialism and secularism are preached but hierarchy, 
inequality emotionalism and particularism are extensively practised at 
home and in all sectors of the society.(p.432) 
The reasons for fragmented social control in the Third World can be traced to the 
colonial past. According to Migdal(1988), land tenure laws, taxes, and new modes of 
transportation introduced by imperial rulers destroyed the old social and political 
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arrangements within a very short period of colonization. Imperial powers preferred to 
rule through fragmented, indigenous leadership and local strongmen, rather than by 
establishing centralized social control in place of the old system. Thus, in these colonized 
societies, old social control was replaced by fragmented social control. Establishment of 
the Zamindari system and permanent settlement of land by British in India after 1858 are 
examples of fragmentation. Even in the societies that escaped former colonial rule, 
Migdal(1988) points out, “the alliance of European merchants and indigenous strongmen 
limited the ability of the state leaders to concentrate social control”( pp.51,91,127,&262). 
6. Fragmented Social Control and Penetration by the State into a 
Population 
To review, “every society needs institutions authorized to exercise force [for 
social control], occasionally, in order to establish confidence.  The most typical form of 
this institution is the state” (Johnson, 1966, p.30). In case of Third World countries, 
where social control is fragmented, the weak state competes with ‘strong’ societies for 
popular control. Therefore, the degree to which social control is fragmented is a measure 
of lack of penetration by the state. The state has a better chance if a distinct society is 
divided compared to the situation when that society is more homogeneous. Therefore, the 
greater the social homogeneity of a distinct population, the less is the penetration of the 
state into that population.  
In India, the population can be divided along many dimensions like religion, 
ethnicity, language and caste. The existence of a strong unifying social identity on any 
one of these dimensions, however, can offset the divisive tendencies of multiplicity in 
other dimensions. A population can have a strong cohesiveness due to a minority 
religion. In such a situation, the state will face strong competition from religious 
institutions in exerting social control over this population. This religious cohesiveness 
will be stronger if the population is less divided along other dimensions like ethnicity, 
language and caste. In other words, the relevant question is whether the particular 
population has a strong sense of separate social identity in contrast to the majority 
population. In view of the foregoing discussion, it can be assumed that the degree of the 
state’s penetration into the population is inversely related to the strength of the separate  
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social identity of that population, and the sense of separate social identity should be 
sought in factors like a homogenous minority religion, regional language, ethnicity, caste, 
etc.    
7. Multiplying Effect of Separate Social Identity for Insurgency 
In an insurgency situation, the fragmentation of social control has a multiplying 
effect in favor of insurgents. It helps the insurgents by influencing the choices made by 
the population. Leites and Wolf (1970) point out that as a rational decision maker, an 
individual or a group in a population assesses the opportunities and/or consequences of 
joining the insurgents or helping the government (p.42). Therefore, an individual who is 
forced to choose one side or the other in an emerging situation will naturally be attracted 
to the one yielding higher social control.  
This is even more apt because the social organizations which exercise social 
control over the individual also provide the person with the necessary trust networks. 
According to Sztompka (1999), an individual who is forced to choose one side or the 
other in an emerging situation is clearly taking a risk. Sztompka quotes Luhmann that 
“trust becomes the solution for specific problems of risk” (p.29). If the insurgents are 
representing the perceived grievances of the local dominant social group, an individual 
belonging to the social group is even more likely to cooperate with the insurgents. 
Moreover, it is clear that the state is not able to provide satisfactory enforcement of their 
laws. On the other hand, the population belonging to these areas is connected to the 
insurgency through the local social network and therefore forms the support base for the 
insurgency. Sikh and Kashmir insurgencies in India are obvious examples of these 
linkages.  
8. Dependence of Insurgents on the Social Networks 
Insurgents also depend on the social networks for their security. Bell (1988) 
describes how an insurgent organization, being an underground organization, is highly 
secretive and consequently inefficient ( pp.204-209). Such an organization is forced to 
fragment into small local groups to avoid detection. It resembles Barabasi’s (2003) 
description of loosely interconnected clusters inside a hierarchical network (Barabasi & 
Bonabeau, 2003, p. 68).  Its existence depends on the risky business of maintaining 
communication and coordination among its clusters with utmost secrecy. Therefore, the 
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insurgents try to prevent entry of anybody who cannot be trusted into their in-group. 
According to Sageman(2004) the terrorist groups resist the temptation to expand through 
recruitment drives or brainwashing in order to ensure security. The preexisting social 
affiliations of an incumbent form the initial basis on which he or she is granted formal 
affiliation (pp. 107&111). For the recruit, also, trust based on social network plays a big 
role, because he or she risks everything, including life, by joining the insurgency. 
Sztompka(1999) explains how social capital, like social networks, family, friendship and 
religion, helps in taking risk (pp129-131).  
Therefore, the existence of a separate social identity in the target population is 
very helpful to the insurgents. On the other hand, if the insurgents are not linked to the 
entire population, it can be their weakness. According to Gill(2001), the Sikh insurgency, 
which ultimately could not sustain itself, was waged not by the entire Sikh community, 
but was “actually a rebellion of a privileged, quasi-feudal, caste based orthodoxy that saw 
its privileges shrinking” (pp.68-69). Gill also speaks of how “it was the Sikhs . . . that 
stood against the movement for Khalistan. 65 percent of the Punjab police, of course, 
were Sikhs. But more significantly, there was increasing and organized resistance among 
civilians [Sikhs] against terrorist violence” (p.26).  
9. Bureaucracy and Separate Social Identity   
Finally, fragmentation of social control adversely affects the bureaucratic 
agencies of the state. The sense in which Skocpol uses the phrase "bureaucratization of 
state agencies and armed forces," refers to the impersonal and bureaucratic forms of the 
state and its agencies (Skocpol, 1994, p.272). While many non-democratic states have 
highly bureaucratized agencies and armed forces, it is difficult to imagine any reasonably 
large democratic state without bureaucratic agencies. At the time of their independence 
from colonial rule, bureaucracies in the Third World did not have the level of objectivity 
and rational organization which is the hallmark of modern democracies. According to 
Migdal(1988), in a society with fragmented social control, “The bureaus of the state may 
become little more than the arenas for accommodation [by the state] with other 
organizations  [of social control]. Their tentacles may be captured by those with very 
different rules and principles from those expressed in the state’s  legal code, and state 
resources may be used to strengthen the very forces they aimed to eliminate”(pp.265-
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266.). Thus the strength of separate social identity of an area's population can adversely 
affect the bureaucratization of state administration and its police in that area. 
10. Inaccessibility and Insurgency 
In the Third World, the inaccessibility of an area directly helps insurgency in 
many ways. Inaccessible areas provide excellent havens for insurgents. Mack(1974) 
discusses how “operating in uninhabited areas and supplied from without . . . the 
insurgents may simply rely on the mountains and forests to conceal and protect 
them”(Mack, 1974, p.177). 
11. Inaccessibility and Penetration by the State 
The remoteness of an area inhibits penetration by the state into its population in a 
significant way. According to Leites and Wolf (1970), less developed countries have 
units that are physically, functionally, and technologically remotely situated within the 
bigger political entity. The state and its agents are not part of the "life-world" of these 
remote people (p.31), and hence, do not enjoy their confidence. On the other hand, the 
insurgents normally thrive in these remote areas and their social networks. The 
population belonging to these areas is connected to the insurgency through the local 
social network and forms the support base for the insurgency, as discussed above. More 
than the physical distance, remoteness can result from inaccessibility due to forests, 
rugged mountains, inhospitable terrain or extreme climate. As mentioned in earlier 
sections, historical events dating back hundreds of years have resulted in populations 
living in inaccessible areas in the Third World.  Members of the government machinery 
who do not belong to these remote populations are reluctant to go to these places or to 
live there. The government may build schools, hospitals, police stations and other 
facilities, but vast majority of these facilities may be defunct due to absenteeism by 
government employees. Thus the inaccessibility of an area inhibits penetration by the 
state into the local population. 
12. Inaccessibility and Social Change 
Inaccessibility of an area inhibits economic development which might have 
helped the state to better penetrate the population. Economic development is understood 
to have strengthened the state in medieval Europe at the expense of other competing 
agents of social control.  According to Karl Marx, the developments and changes in 
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human history are basically shaped by the economic, technological and more broadly, 
material developments. Similarly, Tilly (1985) describes how, “looking back, one cannot 
help but be struck by the seemingly symbiotic relationship existing between the state, 
military power, and the private economy’s efficiency in the age of absolutism” (p.179). 
The dynamism that is instigated by economic developments or cognitive changes 
resulting from exposure to science, technology and democracy has also induced a slow 
social transformation in countries like India.  In India, for example, economic 
developments have forced people to migrate from one area to another or from rural areas 
to urban industrial areas, greatly reducing the hold of the pre-independence social 
controls by caste, village, religion and tribe.  
However, because this transformation is related to economic development, it 
bypasses the inaccessible areas within the country. In these areas, for geographical or 
historical reasons, very little economic development has taken place since India’s 
independence. Hilly areas, due to their inaccessibility, and forest areas, due to 
environmental protection concerns, do not get their share of economic development. At 
the same time, large scale migration from these areas is impeded by the people's 
attachment to their ancestral lands. Thus the inaccessibility of an area insulates the area 
from social transformation that affects the other areas of the society. 
13. Inaccessibility and Relative Deprivation 
The inhabitants of inaccessible areas feel an acute sense of relative deprivation 
because of all the points discussed above. Increases in the flow of information into these 
areas through radio, TV, long distance telephone and the internet have contributed to this 
sense of deprivation. These communication channels bring information about what 
goodies are available to others in the country, what opportunities the society is supposed 
to provide, and the tall claims by national and regional politicians about what has been 
made available to every citizen.  But because of economic underdevelopment, the 
inhabitants of inaccessible areas do not find any of these things available to them in 
sufficient quantity. This contributes to the sense of relative deprivation which in turn 
increases the disposition to collective violence. According to Gurr(1970), “the capacity, 
but not the need, for violence appears to be biologically inherent in men. The disposition 
 to collective violence depends on how badly societies violate socially derived 
expectations about the means and ends of human action”(p.317). 
14. Inaccessibility and Exclusion from State 
The inaccessibility of a population also affects the relative power position of its 
politicians in the state’s politics. If its representatives are marginalized in the national 
level politics, then the population can be expected to have less sense of inclusion in state 
governance. Thus inaccessibility is a hindrance to the state's inclusiveness. Clearly, 
inaccessibility of a population both determines and reflects the penetration by the state 
into the population as well as the population’s inclusion in the state’s politics.     
15. External Unifying Influence and Insurgency 
Finally, a short discussion about the internal social dynamics of the target 
population can provide insight into yet another aspect which has contributed to the 
growth of insurgency in India. How Third World societies are fragmented has already 
been discussed. Even a small population may have many divisions. One of the basic 
divisive aspects of an otherwise homogenous population is kinship segmentation. Such 
segments usually remain divided but can unite in certain circumstances. Keiser (2002) 
brings out this segmentary opposition in his study of an isolated population in Pakistan. 
He, however, describes how “[sometimes] segmentary units mobilize [or unite] to protect 
their reputation and their rights to natural resources” (p.82.). Therefore, it is suggested 
that a unifying external force can play a catalytic role in unifying and aligning the 
segments, very much the way domains of a ferromagnetic substance become aligned by 
an external magnetic field (shown below). The external unifying force is not necessarily 
from across the country’s political boundary. It can be any influence external to the target 
population.     
 
Un-magnetized Material Magnetized Material 
Figure 2.   External Unifying Influence  
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Thus the strength of the separate social identity of a population and its 
inaccessibility affect all three dimensions of Skocpol’s model. At the same time, the 
presence of a unifying external force can help mobilize the segments of an isolated 
population.  
 
D.  HYPOTHESES 
Based on the discussion above, I advance the following hypothesis. 
In India, the degree of inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social 
identity of its population, and the amount of external unifying influence on it, determine 
the propensity of that area for insurgency. 
 
E. SCOPE 




1. A simple model is developed to explain the emergence and strength of 
insurgencies in India. 


















II. THE MODEL 
A. PROBLEM 
As discussed in the first chapter, according to Skocpol, the degree of penetration 
of national territory by a state, the extent of incorporation of socially mobilized groups, 
and the level of bureaucratization of the state administration and its armed forces, 
determine the probability of revolution against the state. This is shown diagrammatically 
in the model (see figure 1 at page 8).  
It was pointed out that India, with a history of democratic governance for more 
than fifty years, should ideally score high on all the three dimensions. In fact, the model 
explains India’s stability and success in the face of all odds. However, in spite of its 
democracy, since independence India has experienced insurgencies in various areas 
which require explanation.  In the previous chapter, the explanation of Indian 
insurgencies was traced to certain aspects of the society and state inherited by Third 
World nations from their colonial past. These aspects, like the fragmentation of social 
control and the preponderance of relative deprivation in inaccessible areas, affect all the 
three dimensions of Skocpol’s model. However, it is difficult to empirically verify the 
explanation using Skocpol’s model, as the three dimensions it presents are difficult to 
measure quantitatively. Therefore, a slightly different model is developed in this chapter, 
with dimensions that are easier to estimate empirically.  
 
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
1. Assumptions 
Assumption 1: The greater the sense of separate social identity a population has, 
the more prone it is to insurgency. 
Assumption 2: The more inaccessible an area, the more vulnerable it is to 
insurgency.   
Assumption 3: A unifying external force can play a catalytic role in unifying and 




There are four variables: (1) the degree of inaccessibility of an area, (2) the 
strength of separate social identity of its population, (3) the strength of external unifying 
influence on the population, and (4) the propensity towards insurgency shown by the 
area. The first three are independent variables and the fourth is the dependent variable. 
3. Relationship among the Variables 
The basis for this model is the hypothesis that in India, the degree of 
inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social identity of its population, and the 
amount of external unifying influence upon it, determine the propensity of that area for 
insurgency. The relationship among the variables is presumed to be linear. 
I = CxX + CyY + CzZ, + I0 where  
I is the propensity towards insurgency shown by an area, 
I0  is the value of I when all the other factors on the right-hand side are 0, 
X is the strength of separate social identity of its population, 
Y is the degree of inaccessibility of the area, and 
Z is the amount of external unifying influence on the population. 
Cx, Cy, and Cz are coefficients or weights given to each variable. These are 
necessary because all the variables are of different types with different units. Basically, 
this takes care of the fact that tigers, dogs and hyenas are added and compared with 
elephants.  
The Indian insurgency model looks like the following figure. 
 Revolution most likely 
Separate Social Identity 




Figure 3.   Indian Insurgency Model 
 
4. Definitions 
The Strength of Separate Social Identity (SSI): Can be defined as the sense of 
separation from majority population through religion, language, ethnicity, and any other 
distinct social attribute of the population as a whole. In other words: 
X = CxrelXrel  + CxlangXlang + CxethnXeth + Cx?X?, where 
Xrel is the SSI due to religion. It is taken as 1 in case the population mostly 
belongs to a minority religion, otherwise it is 0.  
Xlang is the SSI due to language. It is taken as 1 in case the population 
mostly speaks a minority language, otherwise it is 0. 
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Xethn is the SSI due to ethnicity. It is taken as 1 in case the population 
mostly belongs to one ethnic group, otherwise it is 0. 
X? is the SSI due to any other social attribute. It should be computed the 
same way as above. An example of such a social attribute is caste. This 
analysis, however, is limited to the first three attributes only. 
Cxrel, Cxlang, Cxethn, and Cx? are the coeeficients. 
The Degree of Inaccessibility of an Area(Y): Can be defined as a combination of 
the average amount of forest coverage in that area and the average slope of the terrain of 
that area. In other words: 
Y = CyforYfor  + CyslopeYslope, where 
Yfor is the average forest coverage of an area. If 60% of an area is covered 
by forest, on a scale of 1 to 10, the area will get 6 as its Yfor. 
Yslope is the average slope of the terrain of an area. For example, a flat area 
situated on a plateau and a plain area at sea level may have average slope 
close to 0, while hilly areas have values close to 90 degrees irrespective of 
their altitude. The average slope is a measure of hilliness or undulation of 
an area and not the elevation from sea level.  
 Cyfor and Cyslope are the coefficients. 
The Amount of External Unifying Influence (Z): Can be defined as the proportion 
of persons among the top leadership of the main insurgent groups who are of outside 
origin or who spend a lot of their time outside the affected area. For example, if 2 out of 6 
top leaders of the main insurgent group either do not belong to the area or live outside the 
area, then on a scale of 1 to 10, the insurgency gets Z = 3.33.   
Propensity for Insurgency: This is the dependent variable. It can be defined as the 





C. METHODOLOGY FOR TESTING THE MODEL 
Due to paucity of time and resources, attempts are made to verify the correlation 
only between the level of insurgency (dependant variable) and the following two 
dimensions (independent variables):  Degree of Inaccessibility of an Area, and Strength 
of Separate Social Identity of its Population. 
The third dimension, External Unifying Influence, is dealt with less rigorously 
and supported through empirical observations. 
Units for Comparison: The parliamentary constituencies have been taken as units 
for statistical comparison. The lower house of the Indian parliament is composed of 
representatives of the people chosen by direct election on the basis of adult suffrage. The 
maximum strength of the House envisaged by the Constitution is 552, with up to 530 
members representing the states, up to 20 members representing the Union Territories, 
and not more than two members nominated by the President of India. For the purpose of 
elections to parliament, the entire country and population are divided into parliamentary 
constituencies of more or less equal population size.  This analysis uses 528 
constituencies belonging to the states, for the sake of comparison. Each unit has about 
one million population, which makes the population of each unit of comparison more or 
less equal in size.   
Combining Variables: Both the independent variables and each of their 
components are of different types and the units of measurements adopted are also 
arbitrary. Therefore, for combining or adding them, coefficients are used. Regression 
analysis by Microsoft Excel is used to find the values of the coefficients which optimizes 
the correlation of the combination of independent variables with the dependent variable. 
However, for more accurately identifying the relevance of individual independent 
variables, the correlation between each component of the independent variable is also 
compared with the dependent variable.  
Correlation: If the causal relationship hypothesized on the basis of the theoretical 
arguments is correct, then there should be high correlation between the combination of 
independent variables and the dependent variable. The reverse may not be true, i.e., a 
strong correlation does not necessarily mean a causal relation. However, a negligible or 
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low correlation would show a lack of linear causal relationship. For computation of the 
correlation, graphical as well as analytical methods are used. In the analytical method, 
Regression Analysis by Microsoft Excel is used. The data on each variable for each unit 
(parliamentary constituency) is tabulated. Then, with the help of the software, the 
correlation between the dependent variables and the independent variable is calculated.    
 
D. DATA 
1. Slope of the Terrain:  
World elevation data was downloaded from Geography Network and the map of 
Indian parliamentary constituencies was downloaded from http://www.eci.gov.in/ official 
portal of Election Commission of India. With the help ArcGIS software, the average 
slope of the terrain for each constituency was calculated. 
a. World Elevation Data     
The data about elevation for India and nearby areas was downloaded from 
Geography Net, with the help of ArcGIS software. The following GIS map represents the 
data graphically. 
  
Figure 4.   Elevation Map of India 
(Source:  http://www.geographynetwork.com/explorer/explorer.jsp?mode=arcmap 
accessed on 7/10/2005) 
23 
 b. Slope Calculation 
Using the above data, ArcGIS software calculated the slope. The 





Figure 5.   Slope Map of India 
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 c. Map of Parliamentary Constituencies 
The following GIS map showing parliamentary constituencies of India 




Figure 6.   Outline Map of Parliamentary Constituencies of India 
(Source: http://www.eci.gov.in/ accessed on 9/4/2005) 
 
d. Average Slope for Each Parliamentary Constituency 
Combining the above map with slope data, ArcGIS calculated the average 
slope for each constituency. The data is given below graphically for the state of Orissa, 
where the first number within each constituency shows the average slope of that 
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 constituency in degrees and the alphanumerical number below it shows the identifying 
code number of the constituency. The identifying code number is unique for each 
parliamentary constituency. This number has been used as the key number for tabulating 
and handling the data. 
  
Figure 7.   Average Slope Shown on a Map 
(The first number in each constituency shows the average slope of that constituency in 




 2. Average Forest Cover  
Average forest cover has been calculated by visual estimation of the amount of 
forest as presented on the official site of the Environment Ministry of the Government of 
India juxtaposed onto the parliamentary constituency maps. 
a. Statewide Forest Maps 
Maps of statewide forest coverage were downloaded from State of Forest 
Report (2001) by National Forest Commission of India. These maps were superimposed 




Figure 8.   Map of Forest Coverage of Orissa State 
(Source: http://envfor.nic.in/nfc/s-chap-6.pdf  6/27/2005) 
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 3. Separate Social Identity (SSI) 
As discussed in Section B.4 of this chapter, SSI is the sense of separation from the 
majority population through religion, language, and ethnicity. Therefore, data was 
collected separately for the three aspects of SSI. 
a. SSI due to Religion 
The following map shows the demographic distribution of religion in 
India. Only data regarding places where a minority religion was majority was tabulated. 
Except for a couple of small pockets, the areas where religious minorities are in  the 
majority coincide with parts of state boundaries. 
  
Figure 9.   Map of Religions in India 




b. SSI due to Language 
The following map shows the demographic distribution of languages in 
India. Hindi is the language spoken by the majority population. The major linguistic 
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 minorities’ areas coincide with the state boundaries. In the introductory chapter of this 
thesis, it was mentioned that the Indian constitution recognizes 23 official languages 
(Encyclopedia: India.). The official number of "mother tongues" spoken in India is 1,683, 
of which an estimated 850 are in daily use. The SIL Ethnologue lists 387 living languages 
for India (Encyclopedia: Indian languages.2005). For the purpose of this study, data was 
confined to the main linguistic minorities. 
 
Figure 10.   Map showing Main Indian Languages 
(Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/index.html  accessed on 7/10/2005) 
 
c. SSI due to Ethnicity  
The following GIS map shows parliamentary constituencies of India. 
There are some constituencies which are reserved for persons belonging to certain castes. 
Similarly, some constituencies are reserved for tribes. These are called Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes. These provisions in the Constitution of India were made to insure 
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 political participation by those sectors of the population because they had inherited social 
and economic handicaps at the time of India’s independence. The ethnic distinctiveness 
of the Scheduled Castes has been lost over the thousands of years of their assimilation 
into the mainstream of Indian society, but the Scheduled Tribes have distinctive ethnicity 
due to their non-assimilation into the mainstream society.  Members of Scheduled Tribes 
can be found nearly everywhere in India, but their population can be taken as 
concentrated in the constituencies reserved for them. Therefore, this data was tabulated 
for distinct ethnicity.  
Reserved for certain castes 
Reserved for Tribal candidates 
Open to all categories 
 
Figure 11.   Map showing Parliamentary Constituencies of India Reserved for Scheduled 
Tribes and Scheduled Castes 




4. External Unifying Influence 
Due to paucity of time and opportunity, data regarding top leadership of different 
insurgent groups could not be collected. Therefore, the relevance of this variable could 
not be established through quantitative correlation. As an alternative, empirical evidence 
has been used to verify this dimension of the model, as discussed later in this chapter. 
5. Level of Insurgency 
A rigorous definition of level of insurgency would be highly desirable. There are 
both spatial as well as temporal aspects to insurgency. The level of insurgency can refer 
to the duration of an insurgency, the peak level of violence perpetrated by it, the total 
amount of violence, the level of popular support, the strength of the cadre, the size of the 
affected population as a percentage of the total target population, the size of security 
forces deployed by the state to control it, the area over which the insurgents have real 
control, or the extent to which the insurgency achieves its objectives. In this thesis, the 
measure of the level of insurgency is based on the author's considered but informal 
judgment of all the criteria based on experience and a review of relevant literature. 
Naga Insurgency: This is the oldest and most mature insurgency in India. 
It is called Mother of Insurgency in India. The insurgents in northeast India have looked 
upon the Naga insurgents for inspiration. It has been able to hold its ground for more than 
50 years and perpetrate violence at will. Recently, one of the two factions of Naga 
insurgents has started talks with the government of India for a peaceful solution. All 
things considered, it is evaluated I =5. 
Kashmir Militancy: Though the insurgency has been active for only about 
25 years, its consistently high level of violence and daring actions beyond its area of 
influence puts it close to the level of Naga insurgency. It is evaluated I = 4.   
Mizo Insurgency: This was active for about 10 years but during that time 
the level was very high. It arrived at a peaceful solution with government of India, and 
the insurgents achieved part of their demands. Its leaders went on to participate in state 
democratic politics and gained power off and on. Thus, they are evaluated I = 4. 
Sikh Militancy of Punjab: Punjab militancy was very violent and daring. 
For about 18 years it created terror in Punjab and nearby areas, including the national 
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capital. It attracted international attention by its level of violence. However, it could not 
hold its ground and was crushed. It is evaluated I = 3. 
Tripura Tribal Militancy: The tiny state of Tripura has been ravaged by 
tribal militancy for nearly 25 years. The level of violence has been high, but it consists 
mostly of kidnapping. It is evaluated I = 3. 
Insurgency in Assam: Though this insurgency has been active for about 25 
years, its level of violence and activities have been decreasing over the years. It is 
evaluated I = 2. 
Darjeeling Gorkha Agitation: This was not an insurgency in true sense 
since they did not demand separation from the union, but the level of violence and tactics 
puts them in the same category. They were successful in achieving parts of their 
objective. It is evaluated I = 2. 
Left Wing Extremism: The left wing extremism is quite high in certain 
core areas whereas in other areas they operate only once in a while. Though a large 
number of districts in the central part of India are affected by this insurgency, the average 
level in the entire area is low. Not having a resolution on the variation in the level of 
extremism within the affected area, it is taken as uniform and evaluated I = 1. 
Other Minor Insurgencies: There are minor insurgencies in Manipur and 
Arunachal Pradesh, which have been evaluated as I = 1.    
The following map showing insurgency in India, expressed in terms of high and 
low intensity conflict, was also used for identifying boundaries. 
  
Figure 12.   Map of Major Insurgencies in India 
(Source: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/images/indiaconflict.jpg accessed on 
7/12/2005) 
 
6. Tabulation of Data 
The above data was tabulated in an EXCEL work sheet. Except for the slope, 
forest, and insurgency, all other values were entered 1 for presence and 0 for absence. 
The slope was entered as calculated by ArcGIS software from data taken from 
Geography Net, forest was entered on a scale of 1 to 10, and insurgency was entered on a 
scale of 1 to 5. The tabulated data can be seen in Annex I.   
 
E. TESTING THE MODEL 
If the causal relationship suggested by the hypothesis is correct, then there should 
be a high correlation between the combination of independent variables and the 
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dependent variable. In other words, a negligible or low correlation would show a lack of 
causal relationship. The following causal relationship was tested using available data. 
I = CxX + CyY + CzZ + I0, where  
I is the propensity towards insurgency shown by an area, 
I0 is the value of I when all the other factors on the right-hand side are 0, 
X is the strength of separate social identity of its population, 
Y is the degree of inaccessibility of the area, and 
Z is the amount of external unifying influence on the population. 
Cx, Cy, and Cz are coefficients or weights given to each variable.  
Because data has been collected only for X and Y, and because both the variables 
have been further broken into their components, the relationship to be tested can be 
expressed by the following equation.   
I =CxrelXrel  + CxlangXlang + CxethnXeth + CyforYfor  + CyslopeYslope + I0 
I0 is the value of I when all the other factors on the right-hand side are 0, 
Xrel is the SSI due to religion.  
Xlang is the SSI due to language.  
Xethn is the SSI due to ethnicity.  
Yfor is the average forest coverage of an area. 
Yslope is the average slope of the terrain of an area.  
Cxrel, Cxlang, Cxethn, Cyfor, and Cyslope are the coefficients. 
For verification by correlation, both the graphical method as well as the analytical 
method are used.  
1. Graphical Method 
For graphical comparison, the maps of slope, forest, religion, language, and 
ethnicity, available in section D of this chapter, were superimposed on each other and 
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Figure 13.   Combined Map of Inaccessibility 
 
Then, other aspects like ethnicity, religion and language were superimposed to 
produce the following map (on the left side). This map was compared with the right side 
map showing insurgencies. 
then the superimposed map was compared with the map of insurgency. First, the 





affected areas are 
shown in shades of red 
Figure 14.   Maps showing Combination of Independent Variables (left) and Insurgencies (right) 
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2. Statistical Method 
a. Analysis of Data 
Individual correlation of each of the independent variables with the 
dependent variable (insurgency) was calculated using the RSquare function of Microsoft 
Excel. The results are given below. 





Average Slope  0.019 
Forest Cover 0.128 
Militant Minority Religion 0.476 
Non-Militant Minority Religion 0.028 
Minority Language 0.042 
Distinct Ethnicity 0.041 
Table 2. Correlation between Individual Independent Variables and the Dependent 
Variable 
 
The following results were found when a regression analysis was done to 


































Table 3. Coefficients and Correlation through Regression Analysis 
 
Therefore, the equation showing the relationship between the variables of 
the model becomes: 
I = 3.015Xrel + 0.162Xlang + 0.433Xeth + 0.116Yfor - 0.004Yslope + 0.027 
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b. Interpretation of the Results 
Relative relevance of different independent variables:  Based on the 
RSquare values shown above, the following is the order of relative relevance of the 
independent variables tested for their influence on insurgency. 
1. Militant Minority Religion 
2. Forest cover 
3. Minority Language 
4. Distinct Ethnicity 
5. Non-Militant Minority Religion 
6. Average Slope of the Affected Area 
Co-variation among the independent variables: Though the independent 
variables are independent with respect to the propensity of an area towards insurgency, 
which is the dependent variable, they are not totally independent of each other. For 
example, the RSquare value between ‘forest cover’ and ‘slope’ is 0.34. Similarly, 77% of 
forests lie in areas having average slope more than 45 degrees, which lie in about 1/3rd of 
all the parliamentary constituencies. This can be explained by the fact that over thousands 
of years, after the introduction of iron implements, most of forest areas in the plane, 
accessible lands have been converted to agricultural land. The forests in the relatively 
inaccessible areas have escaped this conversion. Therefore, the Rsquare value of 
combined correlation, 0.644, is less than the sum of individual Rsquare values which is 
0.734. This interdependence is also the reason why one of the coefficients is negative.   
The value I0 : Since I0 is the value of I when all the other factors on the 
right hand side are absent, a small positive value indicates that in India there is a 
propensity for insurgency, however small it may be, in any population even without any 
of the enabling factors. In other words, a small niche is available for the extremists in any 
population in India. This appeals to the common sense also, because occasional localized 
political violence has been seen in almost every part of the country after its 
independence. Moreover, this corroborates McCormick and Giordano model for Band 
Wagon Effect on the growth of insurgency. 
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Figure 15.   McCormick Giordano Model of Support for Insurgency  
(Source: Paper presented by Prof Gordon McCormick and Prof Frank Giordano at 
Insurgency Board, Washington DC, February 18 2005) 
 
According to this model, the willingness of a population to support 
insurgency depends on the perceived size of the support for that insurgency, as given in 
above figure. However, even when the insurgency is young and the insurgent 
organization is negligibly small, there will be always some people ready to support the 
insurgency.  
The value of RSquare: The relatively high value of RSquare indicates a 
high correlation, which is consistent with the relationship proposed in the model between 
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 the variables tested above, i.e., inaccessibility and separate social identity, with 
insurgency. To that extent the model is verified statistically. 
3. Verifying the Relevance of External Unifying Influence 
Though I do not have the data to verify this dimension of the model statistically, it 
can be supported by empirical evidence. Sikh militancy provides a good example of 
effect of external influence on insurgency. It is well known that Pakistan heavily 
supported and guided Sikh terrorism during its heyday in Punjab. According to Gill 
(2001), “Pakistan was strenuously and openly directing the terrorist campaign at this 
stage [1989], to the extent that terrorist training camps were being organised even within 
75 metres of the international border (in the Ferozepur sector).” He further adds that 
“border crossings remained a continuous and daily occurrence along the 533 kilometre 
long international border Punjab shared with Pakistan, and could never really be 
effectively checked, despite 122 kilometres of fencing that had been erected by August 
1989” (p.53). However, according to the Indian government's 2003-2004 Annual 
Report of Ministry of Home Affairs, the India-Pakistan border fencing on the Punjab 
sector was completed by 1993 (Annual report of ministry of home affairs, government of 
india.2004). There was also a sharp decline in Sikh insurgency during and after 1993, as 
shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 16.   Civilians, Police and Terrorist Casualties in Punjab - 1981-1996 
(Source: (Gill, K. P. S., 2001, p.70)) 
40 
 41 
Though the credit for quelling Sikh militancy cannot be given solely to border 
fencing, the coincidence in timing does not seem unrelated. According to Singh (Singh, 
2003), 
It [border fencing along the Indo-Pak border in Punjab] went a long way 
in controlling movement across the border. Infiltration of armed militants 
was reduced to a trickle and the inflow of weapons was substantially 
reduced. Intercepted documents mentioned that terrorists were finding it 
"very hazardous to cross the border.” The Punjab Police, thereafter, 
decimated the diminishing ranks of the terrorists. The graph of violence 
came down sharply and, by 1994, terrorism in the state was contained. In 
fact, what was achieved by the internal security forces in Punjab has yet to 
be replicated anywhere else in the world. 
Thus, border fencing helped to cut off or minimize outside influence on the Sikh 
population in Punjab and decreased its propensity towards insurgency. It was easier to 
disrupt the extremist political mobilization after the border fencing was complete. This is 
an example of macro-level insulation from external influence. There are examples of 
micro-level insulation also. Professor Kalev Sepp (2005) describes the efficacy of 
"berming" in controlling insurgency in Iraq (See Annex II). Berming is basically 
insulating a town by building a mud wall around it and enforcing access control for 
vehicles. It is similar to border fencing at the micro level. It decreases external influence 
on the town population, since in Iraq insurgents use vehicles for their movements in and 
out of the towns. According to Prof Sepp, berming is “problematic for the insurgents and 
criminal gangs.  It lengthens their time of travel, limits their choices of routes, and 
increases their risk of capture, especially if they're shipping weapons . . . Berming was 
considered successful enough in Mosul that Tall Afar was bermed before the major 
coalition and Iraqi military operation in September to clear out the Serai neighborhood.  
Samarra, long a contested town, will likely be bermed next” (See Annex II). Clearly 
berming is used in Iraq to cut off external influence before enforcing political 
remobilization. 
The role of physical barriers in decreasing the effect of external force also seems 
evident in the case of Israel. According to the government of Israel’s official web  
 
 
 document, "The Anti-Terrorist Fence - An Overview" (2004), comparing the number of 
suicide attacks before and after the construction of fencing leads to the unavoidable 
conclusion that 
Construction of the fence in Samaria was followed by a significant 
decrease in the number of suicide attacks originating from the area. Yet, in 
Judea, where no fence was built, there was no reduction in the number of 
attacks.(p.3) 
The earlier metaphor of ferromagnetic substance can elaborate this point. The 
magnetic lines of force which helped in magnetizing the substance can be cut off by 
keeping the substance in magnetic insulation. Thereafter, there are many ways the 
magnetic alignment can be disrupted or even realignment achieved in the desired 
direction.   
It can also be explained in terms of Prof Gordon McCormick’s model, shown 
below (see also Special Warfare, September 2005, Vol. 18, No. 2, p.8). According to this 
model, the state, the insurgents, and the foreign actors are all targeting the population. 
Therefore, above Indian model can be seen as a sub-model of Prof McCormick’s general 














A. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
1. Defining External Influence 
In this paper, the extent to which the top leadership of an insurgency comes from 
or resides outside the contested area is presented as the sole indicator of the amount of 
external unifying influence influencing the population living in that area. Admittedly, it 
ignores various other ways in which the population living in an area can be influenced 
from outside. Internet and other forms of communications, for example, can be used to 
reach the population and may provide unity. When required, physical contacts can be 
made through low-level go-betweens, making travel by top leaders unnecessary. 
Nevertheless, this definition is used because of the following considerations. Historically, 
almost every top leader of an armed rebellion, during its earliest stage, has taken refuge 
in territory outside the contested area (e.g., Lenin in France and Austria, Sun Yat-Sen in 
Japan, Fidel Castro in Mexico, Che Guevara in Mexico, Hekmatyar in Pakistan, and Ho 
Chi Minh in China). Almost all the top leaders of Sikh, Kashmir, Naga, Tripura, and 
Mizo insurgencies of India have done the same. Second, the areas in the Third World 
with the maximum propensity for insurgency are relatively inaccessible and without 
much electronic connectivity. Thus person-to-person connectivity is still critical. Third, 
unless an insurgency has succeeded in creating a liberated zone within the contested area, 
the contested area remains a dangerous war zone. An insurgency is normally associated 
with its top leader(s), and their survival becomes very important for the unity and morale 
of the insurgents. The foreign sponsors and the insurgents, therefore, want to keep the top 
leaders safe and away from the war zone.  This gives the sponsoring country greater 
capacity to more effectively influence the insurgency.  
Similarly, in this thesis the sense of separate social identity is confined to three 
social factors: religion, language and ethnicity, which are not exhaustive. Other aspects 
like caste, subculture, and even strong class consciousness can give a population a sense 
of separation from the majority population. However, it is presumed that the enabling 
factors behind Indian insurgencies have been limited to the three social aspects which 
were empirically tested.  
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2. Availability of Data  
The parliamentary constituencies were chosen as units for statistical correlation 
because data was available for them. Though the number of constituencies is large, each 
constituency is fairly big, with an average area of about 6000 km2 and more than a 
million voters. Due to their sizes, most of these constituencies do not have uniform 
distributions of the variables considered for correlation. Therefore, a finer resolution with 
more units of smaller sizes will throw more light on the way these factors influence the 
dependent variable as well as each other. For example, a small part of a parliamentary 
constituency may be more undulated or forested, while rest of the land may be flat plain 
or less forested, giving rise to low values for slope or forest. Because the average forest 
cover is also partially dependent on the slope, with the RSquare value between the two 
variables being 0.34, a portion of the entire constituency may be highly inaccessible, 
despite the constituency's low average of inaccessibility as a whole. Therefore, a larger 
number of data units may reveal a higher or lower correlation between forest and slope as 
well as a higher or lower correlation between insurgency and inaccessibility.  
Similarly, a more objective and quantitative definition of level of insurgency is 
desirable but could not be adopted because the necessary data is not available in the 
secondary and tertiary sources. Thus, the statistical analysis is limited by lack of data.  
 
B. STATIC AND DYNAMIC ASPECTS OF THE MODEL 
The model has both static as well as dynamic aspects. The geographic factors 
constitute the static aspect of the model, while historical and human factors belong to the 
dynamic aspect. The inability of Third World countries to develop strong states, as 
suggested by Migdal (1988),  remains unchanged, if the following dynamisms are not 
acknowledged or taken into consideration. 
1. Inaccessibility 
The accessibility of an area is changeable. Deforestation for economic activities 
has opened up large tracts of land which were earlier inaccessible due to dense forest. 
The most densely populated fertile heartland of India, irrigated by the river Ganges and 
its branches, was covered by dense forest before the advent of iron axes. Similarly, roads 
and railroads cut through dense forests and highly undulated land and make them more 
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accessible. Generally, the discovery of profitable economic opportunities in remote 
inaccessible areas has led to human activities that make the area more accessible. A tribe 
inhabiting in an inaccessible area might have remained isolated from the larger political, 
social, and economic system for thousands of years, until mineral deposits were 
discovered or the area was deemed suitable for tea and coffee cultivation by British 
colonizers. Within a few years of such a discovery, the area becomes open to outsiders, 
sucking the local population into the larger political-economic system. This assimilation, 
over a number of generations, may integrate the tribesmen into the larger social system. 
Thus, in some areas, local tribes may get identified as castes of the more complex society, 
while elsewhere the local tribes remain isolated communities and not integrated into the 
more complex social system.  
2. Global Trends 
There are macro trends or currents, seen all over the globe, which may affect a 
population's sense of separate social identity at the micro level. Some trends, like 
religious fundamentalism and ethnic revivalism, have a tendency to increase the sense of 
separation, while others, like westernization and urbanization, tend to decrease the sense 
of separation.  
3. Relative Deprivation 
Apart from roads and railroads, other forms of communication links have been 
increasing at a faster rate with the advent of radio communication and developments in 
information technology. Irrespective of economic development in general and its effects 
on an area, communication links, like radio and television broadcast, telephone 
connections, and internet connections, have penetrated areas considered physically 
inaccessible. Although transport and communications infrastructure are important 
enabling factors for an area's economic development, when the standard of living does 
not improve, improved communication can engender a sense of relative deprivation. 
Through the flow of information, knowledge, propaganda, and physical contact, a 
population's general expectations may increase.  But without the means to achieve their 
increased expectations, improved communications can create a greater sense of relative 
deprivation. Thus, an increase in accessibility may produce a greater sense of separation, 
due to an increase in the population's sense of relative deprivation. 
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4. Changes in the Enabling Factors 
Global trends and a sense of relative deprivation can increase a population's sense 
of separation, while increased accessibility through roads, railroads, and other means can 
decrease the sense of separation. As discussed below, democratic mobilization and 
economic development can also decrease the sense of separation. Similarly, physical 
barriers can cut off external influences on an insurgency. Thus all the dimensions of the 
model have some aspects that change, making it more dynamic and time-specific. The 
situation in an area may have changed dramatically since India's independence. Some 
enabling factors may have increased while others have decreased.   
 
C. ROLE OF DEMOCRACY 
Democracy's detractors point to the many instabilities in democratic countries in 
the Third World, arguing the unsuitability of democratic governance for Third World 
countries. Ausuf Ali (2000) at the online website beliefnet.com, describes how 
“Pakistanis have developed a sad conviction that democracy as we know it is not a 
workable form of government for their country, because Pakistanis do not have the social 
psychology, the political culture, the social ethics, or the common decency for making 
democracy work.” These types of arguments are not limited to Pakistan. One can hear 
them in Thailand, Nepal, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and even in India; indeed, in almost all the 
Third World countries. However, the reason for this instability is that Third World states, 
at the time of their independence from colonial rule, were weak due to the fragmentation 
of social control, which was "dispersed among various social organizations having their 
own rules rather than centralized in the state or organizations authorized by the state” 
(Migdal, 1988, p.40).  
Democratic governance is like walking, cycling or swimming. One learns these 
activities over long periods of time during which one's performance remains clumsy. 
Western democracies took hundreds of years to reach the level of perfection they have 
today. One thing is sure: one cannot learn to swim without entering the water. In his 1999 
keynote address to the World Movement for Democracy, Amartya Sen (1999) pointed 
out how “a country does not have to be judged to be fit for democracy, rather it has to 
become fit through democracy.” Therefore, imperfections in  
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the Third World democracies, and their initial inefficiency in handling centrifugal 
tendencies, should not be taken as evidence that democracy is undesirable in the Third 
World.  
Democracy helps to integrate a population into the state through political 
mobilization, decreasing the population’s sense of separate social identity. On one hand, 
political mobilization and access to information through an independent press in a 
democratic country can increase a population's sense of relative deprivation. On the other 
hand, democracy also provides the channels for expressing perceived grievances which 
might otherwise accumulate and create an explosive situation. Democracy also helps to 
bring these grievances onto the government’s radar, and eventually leads to mitigation of 
some of the grievances. Free and fair elections give legitimacy to the state, thereby 
decreasing the scope for insurgency. In Third World democracies, religious, caste, 
linguistic, and ethnic identities are often used for political mobilization, but instead of 
creating a sense of separation these mobilizations ultimately help to integrate the 
population into the national polity. Initially, such mobilization helps the social group to 
bargain and lobby for its share of political power at both the regional and national levels. 
Democratic India’s history is full of examples of linguistic, caste, religious and ethnic 
separatist movements which eventually transformed themselves into mainstream political 
parties, contributing to the strength of the country's democratic fabric. Thus, in the long 
run, democracy helps to mitigate and neutralize the enabling factors of insurgency.  
 
D. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION BY DECENTRALIZATION 
As discussed above, political mobilization is democracy's main process for 
integrating a population into national polity and strengthening it. Coupled with 
decentralization, democratic political mobilization can reach a country's remotest and 
most inaccessible areas. Decentralization does not mean total autonomy, because without 
a national legal system based on democratic governance, equality, and respect for human 
rights to tie the entire country together, such autonomy can reinforce an autonomous 
area's sense of separate identity. Rather than mitigating its centrifugal tendencies, such 
autonomy can strengthen them. Autonomous tribal areas of Pakistan and FARC 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) autonomous areas (1999-2002) exemplify 
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how such autonomy can lead to islands of chaos and lawlessness. In proper 
decentralization in a democracy, on the other hand, the state partially distributes its power 
to its local units. It does not create a state within, but rather the local unit becomes a more 
empowered part of the state itself. This helps the state to exercise social control more 
effectively and decreases the fragmentation of social control by the local social 
organizations.  
 
E. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1. Desirability of Economic Development 
The role of economic development in integrating an area into the larger political-
economic system of the country is discussed in Chapter I, section C 13. The adverse 
impact of partial development without overall economic development on the sense of 
separation has been already discussed. Economic development increases accessibility. 
Availability of modern economic activities decreases individuals' dependence on a social 
network (typical of subsistence and feudal economies) for economic activities. Economic 
development encourages demographic mobility, which blurs the geographic separation of 
the population from others. Economic development encourages education, which 
empowers individuals and the population to participate better in the larger political-
economic system and decreases their sense of separation. Balanced economic 
development decreases the population’s sense of relative deprivation and resultant sense 
of separation. 
2. Type of Economic Development 
However, in areas of relative inaccessibility, spontaneous economic development 
is unexpected and out of the ordinary. Obviously, Adam Smith’s "invisible hand" has not 
helped the area to develop. Therefore, the state cannot depend on laissez-faire economic 
policy to stimulate economic development in inaccessible and hitherto economically 
unviable areas. The state must create infrastructure and incentives to stimulate 
development. The state’s long term political objectives have to override immediate 
economic considerations. After all, by preventing insurgency, the state can avoid future 
expenditures on counterinsurgency. 
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3. Economic Development in Areas Dominated by Insurgents  
However, the state should be cautious in dealing with an area already dominated 
by insurgents. Keeping in mind a Third World country’s severe constraints on resources, 
careful consideration should be given to the distribution of resources between 
counterinsurgency operations and developmental activities. An insurgent group would 
prefer that the state divert a part of its resources from counterinsurgency to 
developmental activities. This helps the insurgents by decreasing the pressure on them. 
Moreover, if insurgents have good control over the population, they can divert some of 
the developmental resources to themselves. However, if the developmental activities give 
greater advantage to the state, the insurgents will find excuses to oppose such activities.  
4. Economic Development in Tribal Areas  
Caution should also be taken while dealing with areas inhabited by tribesmen. 
The vulnerability of tribes towards outside influence has been highlighted by the 
Yanomami controversy of Brazil. On one hand, there is a need to avoid exposing the 
tribes to outside influence detrimental to their well being. On the other hand, it is not 
desirable to let them live with Stone age technology, because once they are aware of the 
many conveniences of the modern age, they do not want to remain in the Stone age 
(Boforsky, 2005, p.144). If the relative deprivation felt by the tribes is not addressed 
properly by the state, then the insurgents can take advantage of them. Referring back to 
the ferromagnetic metaphor (see Chapter I, section C 15), if the state does not mobilize 
the isolated segmented populations in the desired direction, outsiders can mobilize them 
against the state. 
 
F. INTEGRATION AND HORIZONTAL/VERTICAL LINKAGES 
A marginal population develops linkages outside its geographic limits as it 
mainstreams into the politico-legal structure of the country, integrates into the national 
economy, and becomes more and more integrated into the larger society. The linkages 
can be both vertical and horizontal. For example, an individual belonging to an 
inaccessible area in an Indian state like Assam develops vertical networks through his or 
her social affiliations (like caste, ethnicity or religion). Such networks extend beyond the 
provincial boundaries, because these social affiliations are pan-Indian. Similarly, through 
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profession, trade, political involvement or education, the individual develops vertical 
economic and political linkages with the national economy and polity. In India, most of 
the senior jobs are all-India in scope. Moreover, even the lowest-level government 
employee likely belongs to a provincial or federal service. The more linkages a 
population develops outside the hitherto limited area, the weaker grows the hold of local 
networks on that population. The flip side to this development is the acquisition of 
multiple mutually-incongruent roles by the individual.  This is desirable from 
counterinsurgency point of view, since expectations based on the country's rational legal 
system tend to gain at the expense of local social affiliations.  Influenced by the legal 
expectation of objectivity, a person is forced to sacrifice parochial considerations based 
on ascribed characteristics.  Thus the person becomes integrated into the national polity 
and economy and loses the sense of separate social identity.  
 
G. COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN FOREST AREAS 
Analysis of data in Chapter II, section E 2 b, showed that most of Indian forests 
lie in relatively inaccessible areas. Forests play an important role in insurgency in these 
areas. First, the state, concerned about environment, is committed to preserving the 
forests. The state, therefore, is not able to allow the tribes to carry on destructive practices 
like shifting cultivation1, whereas the insurgents, by keeping the forest employees away, 
help the tribes to carry on the destructive practice. Since the tribes had no role in the 
massive deforestation of the past couple of centuries in other areas for commercial 
purposes, and since they do not fully understand the critical importance of forests today, 
they find the government actions unjust and the insurgents as friends. This makes 
counterinsurgency both difficult as well as important.  Secondly, these areas have 
features that demand appropriate force structure and hardware. 
 
1 In shifting cultivation, tribesmen clear a part of the forest by burning the trees. After using the cleared 
area for subsistence cultivation for two to three years, the tribesmen leave the area and do the same in 
another part of the forest. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made, based on the discussions above: 
1. Economic development of inaccessible and hitherto economically 
unviable areas should be fostered by the state. Careful considerations 
should be undertaken regarding the likely outcome of the governmental 
efforts, particularly in the areas already dominated by the insurgents and in 
the areas inhabited by relatively isolated tribes. 
2. Democratic decentralization, within the broad legal structure based on 
equality and human rights, should be adopted to politically mobilize the 
marginal population in the right direction. 
3. Outside influences inciting the insurgency should be denied access to 
vulnerable areas by constructing physical barriers.  
4. The structure of force and hardware for counterinsurgency operations 
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1 Srikakulam GEN 67.4405 1 0 0 1 0
2 Parvathipuram ST 71.7029 2 0 0 1 1 1
3 Bobbili GEN 63.2641 2 0 0 1 0
4 Visakhapatnam GEN 75.9186 2 0 0 1 0 1
5 Bhadrachalam ST 74.1807 9 0 0 1 1 1
6 Anakapalli GEN 76.9629 3 0 0 1 0 1
7 Kakinada GEN 60.1211 3 0 0 1 0 1
8 Rajahmundry GEN 19.1838 0 0 0 1 0 0
9 Amalapuram SC 28.3793 0 0 0 1 0
10 Narasapur GEN 13.0035 0 0 0 1 0
11 Eluru GEN 23.3937 0 0 0 1 0
12 Machilipatnam GEN 22.7901 0 0 0 1 0 0
13 Vijayawada GEN 34.9229 0 0 0 1 0 1
14 Tenali GEN 13.1977 0 0 0 1 0
15 Guntur GEN 25.1723 0 0 0 1 0 0
16 Bapatla GEN 27.6283 0 0 0 1 0
17 Narasaraopet GEN 52.3784 0 0 0 1 0 0
18 Ongole GEN 39.0796 0 0 0 1 0 0
19 Nellore SC 29.6643 1 0 0 1 0
20 Tirupathi SC 54.6096 1 0 0 1 0 0
21 Chittoor GEN 69.3924 1 0 0 1 0 0
22 Rajampet GEN 75.5448 1 0 0 1 0
23 Cuddapah GEN 64.2306 1 0 0 1 0 0
24 Hindupur GEN 59.0581 0 0 0 1 0 0
25 Anantapur GEN 40.5849 0 0 0 1 0 0
26 Kurnool GEN 33.3595 0 0 0 1 0
27 Nandyal GEN 53.6526 2 0 0 1 0 1
28 Nagarkurnool SC 50.8351 3 0 0 1 0 1
29 Mahabubnagar GEN 36.9827 0 0 0 1 0 1
30 Hyderabad GEN 40.7235 0 0 0 1 0 0
31 Secunderabad GEN 38.5117 0 0 0 1 0 0
32 Siddipet SC 34.4866 0 0 0 1 0 0
33 Medak GEN 33.7563 1 0 0 1 0 1
34 Nizamabad GEN 41.6862 1 0 0 1 0 1
35 Adilabad GEN 56.2728 6 0 0 1 0 1
36 Peddapalli SC 47.7632 3 0 0 1 0 1
37 Karimnagar GEN 47.8528 1 0 0 1 0 1
38 Hanamkonda GEN 36.7919 0 0 0 1 0 1
39 Warangal GEN 44.7401 3 0 0 1 0 1
40 Khammam GEN 51.6037 3 0 0 1 0
41 Nalgonda GEN 46.1271 0 0 0 1 0 0
42 Miryalguda GEN 39.1142 0 0 0 1 0 0
43 Arunachal West GEN 89.5373 10 0 0 1 0 1
44 Arunachal East GEN 85.1471 10 0 0 1 0 1
45 Karimganj SC 42.6422 5 0 0 1 0 2
46 Silchar GEN 55.6387 5 0 0 1 0
47 Autonomous District ST 77.0654 10 0 0 1 1 2
48 Dhubri GEN 20.6916 1 0 0 1 0
49 Kokrajhar ST 33.3951 6 0 0 1 1
50 Barpeta GEN 18.8916 5 0 0 1 0
51 Gauhati GEN 49.0185 4 0 0 1 0 2
52 Mangaldoi GEN 26.0452 4 0 0 1 0 2
53 Tezpur GEN 30.8058 3 0 0 1 0 2
54 Nowgong GEN 45.3422 1 0 0 1 0
55 Kaliabor GEN 32.8601 1 0 0 1 0 2
56 Jorhat GEN 39.0706 3 0 0 1 0 2  
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56 Jorhat GEN 39.0706 3 0 0 1 0 2
57 Dibrugarh GEN 22.1353 7 0 0 1 0 2
58 Lakhimpur GEN 20.647 3 0 0 1 0 2
59 Bagaha SC 20.2682 3 0 0 0 0 0
60 Bettiah GEN 2.91112 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 Motihari GEN 7.27395 0 0 0 0 0 0
62 Gopalganj GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
63 Siwan GEN 2.34633 0 0 0 0 0 0
64 Maharajganj GEN 3.14154 0 0 0 0 0 0
65 Chapra GEN 2.21217 0 0 0 0 0 0
66 Hajipur SC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
67 Vaishali GEN 4.27727 0 0 0 0 0 0
68 Muzaffarpur GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
69 Sitamarhi GEN 2.12743 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 Sheohar GEN 4.42162 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 Madhubani GEN 0.86939 0 0 0 0 0 0
72 Jhanjharpur GEN 10.4146 0 0 0 0 0 0
73 Darbhanga GEN 2.91258 0 0 0 0 0 0
74 Rosera SC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 Samastipur GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
76 Barh GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
77 Balia GEN 0.361031 0 0 0 0 0 0
78 Saharsa GEN 5.19416 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 Madhepura GEN 3.38848 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 Araria SC 3.87573 0 0 0 0 0 0
81 Kishanganj GEN 6.13396 0 0 0 0 0 0
82 Purnea GEN 3.1134 0 0 0 0 0 0
83 Katihar GEN 4.10308 0 0 0 0 0 0
84 Banka GEN 33.1342 1 0 0 0 0 1
85 Bhagalpur GEN 4.97837 0 0 0 0 0 0
86 Khagaria GEN 3.88376 0 0 0 0 0 0
87 Monghyr GEN 47.8898 4 0 0 0 0 0
88 Begusarai GEN 12.7529 0 0 0 0 0 0
89 Nalanda GEN 16.2416 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 Patna GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 Arrah GEN 4.16235 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 Buxar GEN 10.4214 0 0 0 0 0 1
93 Sasaram SC 44.0798 4 0 0 0 0 1
94 Bikramganj GEN 4.31556 0 0 0 0 0 1
95 Aurangabad GEN 27.1162 1 0 0 0 0 1
96 Jahanabad GEN 3.9745 0 0 0 0 0 1
97 Nawada SC 39.1974 1 0 0 0 0 0
98 Gaya SC 21.388 0 0 0 0 0 0
99 Kutch GEN 22.1769 1 0 0 1 0 0
100 Surendranagar GEN 18.4491 0 0 0 1 0 0
101 Jamnagar GEN 33.5881 0 0 0 1 0 0
102 Rajkot GEN 23.3856 0 0 0 1 0 0
103 Porbandar GEN 40.7494 0 0 0 1 0 0
104 Junagadh GEN 51.8456 2 0 0 1 0 0
105 Amreli GEN 38.4318 0 0 0 1 0 0
106 Bhavnagar GEN 42.6588 0 0 0 1 0 0
107 Dhandhuka SC 11.517 0 0 0 1 0 0
108 Ahmedabad GEN 32.2116 0 0 0 1 0 0
109 Gandhinagar GEN 9.11851 0 0 0 1 0 0
110 Mehsana GEN 9.33455 0 0 0 1 0 0
111 Patan SC 15.5093 0 0 0 1 0 0
112 Banaskantha GEN 13.7266 0 0 0 1 0 0
113 Sabarkantha GEN 49.6512 1 0 0 1 0 0
114 Kapadvanj GEN 16.7723 0 0 0 1 0 0
115 Dohad ST 43.1441 1 0 0 1 1 0
116 Godhra GEN 37.61 0 0 0 1 0 0
117 Kaira GEN 5.80817 0 0 0 1 0 0
118 Anand GEN 20.7384 0 0 0 1 0 0
119 Chhota Udaipur ST 42.581 0 0 0 1 1 0
120 Baroda GEN 54.123 0 0 0 1 0 0
121 Broach GEN 43.3611 0 0 0 1 0 0
122 Surat GEN 42.4297 0 0 0 1 0 0
123 Mandvi ST 34.8502 2 0 0 1 1 0
124 Bulsar ST 65.8936 3 0 0 1 1 0
125 Ambala SC 29.4632 2 0 0 0 0 0
126 Kurukshetra GEN 2.59012 1 0 0 0 0 0
127 Karnal GEN 4.06091 1 0 0 0 0 0
128 Sonepat GEN 1.41205 0 0 0 0 0 0
129 Rohtak GEN 2.13637 0 0 0 0 0 0
130 Faridabad GEN 16.2985 0 0 0 0 0 0  
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131 Mahendragarh GEN 19.1407 0 0 0 0 0 0
132 Bhiwani GEN 7.88003 0 0 0 0 0 0
133 Hissar GEN 1.19009 0 0 0 0 0 0
134 Sirsa SC 3.33039 1 0 0 0 0 0
135 Simla SC 88.6434 9 0 0 0 0 0
136 Mandi GEN 89.7548 1 0 0 0 0 0
137 Kangra GEN 85.7156 9 0 0 0 0 0
138 Hamirpur GEN 84.9797 9 0 0 0 0 0
139 Baramulla GEN 87.0821 5 1 0 1 0 4
140 Srinagar GEN 86.029 5 1 0 1 0 4
141 Anantnag GEN 86.8385 5 1 0 1 0 4
142 Ladakh GEN 88.9555 0 0 1 1 0 0
143 Udhampur GEN 88.0122 8 0 0 1 0 0
144 Jammu GEN 81.014 8 0.666667 0 1 0 4
145 Bidar SC 39.876 0 0 0 1 0 0
146 Gulbarga GEN 38.4582 0 0 0 1 0 0
147 Raichur GEN 32.2387 0 0 0 1 0 0
148 Koppal GEN 35.6784 0 0 0 1 0 0
149 Bellary GEN 39.3872 1 0 0 1 0 0
150 Davangere GEN 47.1024 0 0 0 1 0 0
151 Chitradurga GEN 41.724 0 0 0 1 0 0
152 Tumkur GEN 43.8778 0 0 0 1 0 0
153 Chikballapur GEN 54.1469 1 0 0 1 0 0
154 Kolar SC 49.4941 1 0 0 1 0 0
155 Kanakapura GEN 67.8194 0 0 0 1 0 0
156 Bangalore North GEN 25.1368 0 0 0 1 0 0
157 Bangalore South GEN 27.2953 0 0 0 1 0 0
158 Mandya GEN 42.9707 0 0 0 1 0 0
159 Chamarajanagar SC 71.0062 2 0 0 1 0 0
160 Mysore GEN 46.8008 1 0 0 1 0 0
161 Mangalore GEN 74.1931 10 0 0 1 0 0
162 Udupi GEN 61.8166 9 0 0 1 0 0
163 Hassan GEN 55.1005 1 0 0 1 0 0
164 Chikmagalur GEN 68.2873 6 0 0 1 0 0
165 Shimoga GEN 60.4674 7 0 0 1 0 0
166 Kanara GEN 72.3263 9 0 0 1 0 0
167 Dharwad South GEN 30.0214 0 0 0 1 0 0
168 Dharwad North GEN 31.825 0 0 0 1 0 0
169 Belgaum GEN 50.8132 0 0 0 1 0 0
170 Chikkodi SC 41.7102 0 0 0 1 0 0
171 Bagalkot GEN 40.908 0 0 0 1 0 0
172 Bijapur GEN 28.1381 0 0 0 1 0 0
173 Kasaragod GEN 75.0332 5 0 0 1 0 0
174 Cannanore GEN 80.7791 6 0 0 1 0 0
175 Badagara GEN 72.5171 2 0 0 1 0 0
176 Calicut GEN 73.8612 7 0 0 1 0 0
177 Manjeri GEN 69.1404 7 0 0 1 0 0
178 Ponnani GEN 67.5702 1 0 0 1 0 0
179 Palghat GEN 75.3402 4 0 0 1 0 0
180 Ottapalam SC 46.4616 2 0 0 1 0 0
181 Trichur GEN 65.3198 2 0 0 1 0 0
182 Mukundapuram GEN 57.3288 3 0 0 1 0 0
183 Ernakulam GEN 48.5553 2 0 0 1 0 0
184 Muvattupuzha GEN 57.6717 0 0 0 1 0 0
185 Kottayam GEN 19.3505 0 0 0 1 0 0
186 Idukki GEN 87.2384 1 0 0 1 0 0
187 Alleppey GEN 57.0832 0 0 0 1 0 0
188 Mavelikara GEN 33.3055 0 0 0 1 0 0
189 Adoor SC 78.0502 8 0 0 1 0 0
190 Quilon GEN 62.1146 0 0 0 1 0 0
191 Chirayinkil GEN 68.6297 7 0 0 1 0 0
192 Trivandrum GEN 72.4513 3 0 0 1 0 0
193 Morena SC 33.8768 4 0 0 0 0 0
194 Bhind GEN 12.6239 0 0 0 0 0 0
195 Gwalior GEN 37.3236 1 0 0 0 0 0
196 Guna GEN 27.7342 2 0 0 0 0 0
197 Sagar SC 33.0242 3 0 0 0 0 0
198 Khajuraho GEN 25.645 0 0 0 0 0 0
199 Damoh GEN 45.6036 3 0 0 0 0 0
200 Satna GEN 46.8393 2 0 0 0 0 0
201 Rewa GEN 45.5236 1 0 0 0 0 0
202 Sidhi ST 59.8188 3 0 0 0 1 0
203 Shahdol ST 48.4732 3 0 0 0 1 0
204 Balaghat GEN 59.321 6 0 0 0 0 1  
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205 Mandla ST 71.068 5 0 0 0 1 1
206 Jabalpur GEN 46.077 3 0 0 0 0 0
207 Seoni GEN 47.1576 3 0 0 0 0 0
208 Chhindwara GEN 66.194 4 0 0 0 0 0
209 Betul GEN 56.695 3 0 0 0 0 0
210 Hoshangabad GEN 29.3619 1 0 0 0 0 0
211 Bhopal GEN 41.1472 2 0 0 0 0 0
212 Vidisha GEN 35.7156 2 0 0 0 0 0
213 Rajgarh GEN 27.7273 1 0 0 0 0 0
214 Shajapur SC 29.9462 0 0 0 0 0 0
215 Khandwa GEN 45.0544 3 0 0 0 0 0
216 Khargone GEN 56.5429 2 0 0 0 0 0
217 Dhar ST 45.6889 1 0 0 0 1 0
218 Indore GEN 35.4301 0 0 0 0 0 0
219 Ujjain SC 21.1197 0 0 0 0 0 0
220 Jhabua ST 46.8595 1 0 0 0 1 0
221 Mandsaur GEN 31.0336 1 0 0 0 0 0
222 Rajapur GEN 81.8334 5 0 0 1 0 0
223 Ratnagiri GEN 85.366 5 0 0 1 0 0
224 Kolaba GEN 85.3956 5 0 0 1 0 0
225 Mumbai South GEN 89.6929 0 0 0 1 0 0
226 Mumbai South CentralGEN 89.6846 0 0 0 1 0 0
227 Mumbai North Central GEN 89.5199 0 0 0 1 0 0
228 Mumbai North East GEN 88.9665 0 0 0 1 0 0
229 Mumbai North West GEN 81.2825 0 0 0 1 0 0
230 Mumbai North GEN 76.242 0 0 0 1 0 0
231 Thane GEN 73.428 3 0 0 1 0 0
232 Dahanu ST 76.3901 4 0 0 1 1 0
233 Nashik GEN 57.8515 0 0 0 1 0 0
234 Malegaon ST 62.5805 1 0 0 1 1 0
235 Dhule ST 63.4596 0 0 0 1 1 0
236 Nandurbar ST 62.8212 2 0 0 1 1 0
237 Erandol GEN 33.8142 1 0 0 1 0 0
238 Jalgaon GEN 43.7854 0 0 0 1 0 0
239 Buldhana SC 39.1969 0 0 0 1 0 0
240 Akola GEN 32.3891 0 0 0 1 0 0
241 Washim GEN 42.8662 2 0 0 1 0 0
242 Amravati GEN 52.7627 5 0 0 1 0 0
243 Ramtek GEN 46.1327 4 0 0 1 0 0
244 Nagpur GEN 15.9782 0 0 0 1 0 0
245 Bhandara GEN 36.337 8 0 0 1 0 1
246 Chimur GEN 33.399 8 0 0 1 0 1
247 Chandrapur GEN 39.6413 7 0 0 1 0 1
248 Wardha GEN 27.185 1 0 0 1 0 0
249 Yavatmal GEN 39 3 0 0 1 0 0
250 Hingoli GEN 45.234 2 0 0 1 0 0
251 Nanded GEN 35.6693 0 0 0 1 0 0
252 Parbhani GEN 24.4624 0 0 0 1 0 0
253 Jalna GEN 35.6076 0 0 0 1 0 0
254 Aurangabad GEN 49.7967 0 0 0 1 0 0
255 Beed GEN 44.9079 0 0 0 1 0 0
256 Latur GEN 30.5756 0 0 0 1 0 0
257 Osmanabad SC 31.6842 0 0 0 1 0 0
258 Sholapur GEN 26.4614 0 0 0 1 0 0
259 Pandharpur SC 33.2548 0 0 0 1 0 0
260 Ahmednagar GEN 41.3911 0 0 0 1 0 0
261 Kopargaon GEN 48.2635 0 0 0 1 0 0
262 Khed GEN 79.1377 1 0 0 1 0 0
263 Pune GEN 59.3317 0 0 0 1 0 0
264 Baramati GEN 37.4077 0 0 0 1 0 0
265 Satara GEN 68.4911 0 0 0 1 0 0
266 Karad GEN 80.4017 1 0 0 1 0 0
267 Sangli GEN 43.4709 0 0 0 1 0 0
268 Ichalkaranji GEN 74.2766 1 0 0 1 0 0
269 Kolhapur GEN 78.9628 2 0 0 1 0 0
270 Inner Manipur GEN 65.4533 0 0 0 1 0 1
271 Outer Manipur ST 88.4607 9 0 0 1 1 1
272 Shillong GEN 83.8979 8 0 1 1 0 0
273 Tura GEN 71.4797 9 0 1 1 0 0
274 Mizoram ST 88.4207 10 0 1 1 1 4
275 Nagaland GEN 87.9414 9 0 1 1 1 5
276 Mayurbhanj ST 64.4964 4 0 0 1 1 1
277 Balasore GEN 35.5034 0 0 0 1 0 0









279 Jajpur SC 40.0971 0 0 0 1 0 0
280 Kendrapara GEN 26.995 0 0 0 1 0 0
281 Cuttack GEN 51.4752 0 0 0 1 0 0
282 Jagatsinghpur GEN 22.8651 0 0 0 1 0 0
283 Puri GEN 53.8555 2 0 0 1 0 0
284 Bhubaneswar GEN 72.4252 5 0 0 1 0 0
285 Aska GEN 73.6269 3 0 0 1 0 0
286 Berhampur GEN 82.7558 5 0 0 1 0 1
287 Koraput ST 81.1772 4 0 0 1 1 1
288 Nowrangpur ST 56.7325 3 0 0 1 1 1
289 Kalahandi GEN 69.7368 3 0 0 1 0 0
290 Phulbani SC 73.4746 8 0 0 1 0 0
291 Bolangir GEN 44.8369 1 0 0 1 0 0
292 Sambalpur GEN 54.5348 3 0 0 1 0 0
293 Deogarh GEN 64.3241 4 0 0 1 0 0
294 Dhenkanal GEN 72.0824 1 0 0 1 0 0
295 Sundargarh ST 66.4116 4 0 0 1 1 0
296 Keonjhar ST 70.7577 4 0 0 1 1 0
297 Gurdaspur GEN 22.7353 0 1 0 1 0 3
298 Amritsar GEN 3.39903 0 1 0 1 0 3
299 Tarn Taran GEN 3.66921 0 1 0 1 0 3
300 Jullundur GEN 0.301946 0 1 0 1 0 3
301 Phillaur SC 11.1324 0 1 0 1 0 3
302 Hoshiarpur GEN 52.518 2 1 0 1 0 3
303 Ropar SC 10.2272 1 1 0 1 0 3
304 Patiala GEN 4.38099 0 1 0 1 0 3
305 Ludhiana GEN 7.45321 0 1 0 1 0 3
306 Sangrur GEN 6.73044 0 1 0 1 0 3
307 Bhatinda SC 2.90243 0 1 0 1 0 3
308 Faridkot GEN 2.37235 0 1 0 1 0 3
309 Ferozepur GEN 2.02602 0 1 0 1 0 3
310 Ganganagar SC 4.29835 0 0 0 0 0 0
311 Bikaner GEN 9.89248 0 0 0 0 0 0
312 Churu GEN 8.18011 0 0 0 0 0 0
313 Jhunjhunu GEN 22.4776 0 0 0 0 0 0
314 Sikar GEN 31.985 0 0 0 0 0 0
315 Jaipur GEN 25.6351 0 0 0 0 0 0
316 Dausa GEN 38.37 0 0 0 0 0 0
317 Alwar GEN 51.6646 0 0 0 0 0
318 Bharatpur GEN 17.4104 2 0 0 0 0 0
319 Bayana SC 29.8991 1 0 0 0 0 0
320 Sawai Madhopur ST 39.1912 0 0 0 0 1 0
321 Ajmer GEN 33.7824 0 0 0 0 0
322 Tonk SC 15.5867 0 0 0 0 0 0
323 Kota GEN 25.1844 0 0 0 0 0 0
324 Jhalawar GEN 29.4224 1 0 0 0 0 0
325 Banswara ST 44.1765 1 0 0 0 1
326 Salumber ST 62.4889 2 0 0 0 1
327 Udaipur GEN 55.8415 0 0 0 0 0 0
328 Chittorgarh GEN 40.7128 2 0 0 0 0
329 Bhilwara GEN 25.3687 0 0 0 0 0 0
330 Pali GEN 27.2191 0 0 0 0 0 0
331 Jalore SC 40.3034 0 0 0 0 0
332 Barmer GEN 16.128 0 0 0 0 0 0
333 Jodhpur GEN 16.345 0 0 0 0 0 0
334 Nagaur GEN 17.6617 0 0 0 0 0 0
335 Sikkim GEN 89.8186 5 0 1 1 0 0
336 Madras North GEN 30.538 0 0 0 1 0 0
337 Madras Central GEN 57.8153 0 0 0 1 0 0
338 Madras South GEN 62.9345 0 0 0 1 0 0
339 Sriperumbudur SC 21.812 0 0 0 1 0 0
340 Chengalpattu GEN 28.3509 0 0 0 1 0 0
341 Arakkonam GEN 29.6099 0 0 0 1 0 0
342 Vellore GEN 76.0802 3 0 0 1 0 0
343 Tiruppattur GEN 67.4178 0 0 0 1 0 0
344 Vandavasi GEN 41.2417 0 0 0 1 0 0
345 Tindivanam GEN 25.6515 0 0 0 1 0 0
346 Cuddalore GEN 38.4319 0 0 0 1 0 0
347 Chidambaram SC 20.5613 0 0 0 1 0 0
348 Dharmapuri GEN 74.5416 2 0 0 1 0 0
349 Krishnagiri GEN 70.8395 3 0 0 1 0 0
350 Rasipuram SC 69.3811 0 0 0 1 0 0
351 Salem GEN 82.7583 0 0 0 1 0  
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0
351 Salem GEN 82.7583 0 0 0 1 0 0
352 Tiruchengode GEN 40.4109 0 0 0 1 0 0
353 Nilgiris GEN 76.4048 5 0 0 1 0 0
354 Gobichettipalayam GEN 63.5546 5 0 0 1 0 0
355 Coimbatore GEN 34.558 0 0 0 1 0 0
356 Pollachi SC 51.8263 3 0 0 1 0 0
357 Palani GEN 54.4563 2 0 0 1 0 0
358 Dindigul GEN 59.125 0 0 0 1 0 0
359 Madurai GEN 29.9153 0 0 0 1 0 0
360 Periyakulam GEN 82.2501 0 0 0 1 0 0
361 Karur GEN 37.0509 0 0 0 1 0 0
362 Tiruchirappalli GEN 12.4667 0 0 0 1 0 0
363 Perambalur SC 32.5368 0 0 0 1 0 0
364 Mayiladuturai GEN 19.2676 0 0 0 1 0 0
365 Nagapattinam SC 21.8256 0 0 0 1 0 0
366 Thanjavur GEN 12.4299 0 0 0 1 0 0
367 Pudukkottai GEN 25.0217 0 0 0 1 0 0
368 Sivaganga GEN 22.6994 0 0 0 1 0 0
369 Ramanathapuram GEN 25.0132 0 0 0 1 0 0
370 Sivakasi GEN 29.1905 0 0 0 1 0 0
371 Tirunelveli GEN 32.2204 0 0 0 1 0 0
372 Tenkasi SC 53.1769 2 0 0 1 0 0
373 Tiruchendur GEN 59.5584 0 0 0 1 0 0
374 Nagercoil GEN 78.2528 4 0 0 1 0 0
375 Tripura West GEN 30.2633 8 0 0 1 0 3
376 Tripura East ST 57.5705 9 0 0 1 1 3
377 Bijnor SC 15.7373 1 0 0 0 0 0
378 Amroha GEN 9.17037 0 0 0 0 0 0
379 Moradabad GEN 1.45836 0 0 0 0 0 0
380 Rampur GEN 4.48122 0 0 0 0 0 0
381 Sambhal GEN 2.57378 0 0 0 0 0 0
382 Budaun GEN 4.97759 0 0 0 0 0 0
383 Aonla GEN 4.97644 0 0 0 0 0 0
384 Bareilly GEN 2.12808 0 0 0 0 0 0
385 Pilibhit GEN 5.47827 0 0 0 0 0 0
386 Shahjahanpur GEN 0.232025 0 0 0 0 0 0
387 Kheri GEN 8.0116 2 0 0 0 0 0
388 Shahabad GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
389 Sitapur GEN 3.98093 0 0 0 0 0 0
390 Misrikh SC 5.34914 0 0 0 0 0 0
391 Hardoi SC 4.38162 0 0 0 0 0 0
392 Lucknow GEN 9.31245 0 0 0 0 0 0
393 Mohanlalganj SC 2.03541 0 0 0 0 0 0
394 Unnao GEN 0.15996 0 0 0 0 0 0
395 Rae Bareli GEN 0.023921 0 0 0 0 0 0
396 Pratapgarh GEN 5.23963 0 0 0 0 0 0
397 Amethi GEN 1.71506 0 0 0 0 0 0
398 Sultanpur GEN 10.524 0 0 0 0 0 0
399 Akbarpur SC 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
400 Faizabad GEN 10.2692 0 0 0 0 0 0
401 Bara Banki SC 3.73714 0 0 0 0 0 0
402 Kaiserganj GEN 3.66158 0 0 0 0 0 0
403 Bahraich GEN 10.0735 1 0 0 0 0 0
404 Balrampur GEN 12.4773 1 0 0 0 0 0
405 Gonda GEN 2.5537 0 0 0 0 0 0
406 Basti SC 6.37518 0 0 0 0 0 0
407 Domariaganj GEN 5.96803 0 0 0 0 0 0
408 Khalilabad GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
409 Bansgaon SC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
410 Gorakhpur GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0
411 Maharajganj GEN 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
412 Padrauna GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
413 Deoria GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
414 Salempur GEN 8.37257 0 0 0 0 0 0
415 Ballia GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
416 Ghosi GEN 1.50574 0 0 0 0 0 0
417 Azamgarh GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
418 Lalganj SC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
419 Machhlishahr GEN 3.62637 0 0 0 0 0 0
420 Jaunpur GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
421 Saidpur SC 1.85211 0 0 0 0 0 0
422 Ghazipur GEN 15.2722 0 0 0 0 0 0
423 Chandauli GEN 17.9871 4 0 0 0 0 0
424 Varanasi GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
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425 Robertsganj SC 44.9665 5 0 0 0 0 0
426 Mirzapur GEN 20.7902 3 0 0 0 0 0
427 Phulpur GEN 0.650917 0 0 0 0 0 0
428 Allahabad GEN 23.7186 1 0 0 0 0 0
429 Chail SC 15.4703 0 0 0 0 0 0
430 Fatehpur GEN 9.01398 0 0 0 0 0 0
431 Banda GEN 25.192 2 0 0 0 0 0
432 Hamirpur GEN 10.3692 0 0 0 0 0 0
433 Jhansi GEN 22.5774 0 0 0 0 0 0
434 Jalaun SC 13.3857 0 0 0 0 0 0
435 Ghatampur SC 7.2489 0 0 0 0 0 0
436 Bilhaur GEN 13.0416 0 0 0 0 0 0
437 Kanpur GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
438 Etawah GEN 11.2636 0 0 0 0 0 0
439 Kannauj GEN 3.24156 0 0 0 0 0 0
440 Farrukhabad GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
441 Mainpuri GEN 4.14152 0 0 0 0 0 0
442 Jalesar GEN 4.81279 0 0 0 0 0 0
443 Etah GEN 3.67475 0 0 0 0 0 0
444 Firozabad SC 8.28628 0 0 0 0 0 0
445 Agra GEN 14.4006 0 0 0 0 0 0
446 Mathura GEN 1.99706 0 0 0 0 0 0
447 Hathras SC 1.46255 0 0 0 0 0 0
448 Aligarh GEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
449 Khurja SC 2.19214 0 0 0 0 0 0
450 Bulandshahr GEN 9.12401 0 0 0 0 0 0
451 Hapur GEN 10.5031 0 0 0 0 0 0
452 Meerut GEN 4.12779 0 0 0 0 0 0
453 Baghpat GEN 3.55944 0 0 0 0 0 0
454 Muzaffarnagar GEN 8.13974 0 0 0 0 0 0
455 Kairana GEN 4.51876 0 0 0 0 0 0
456 Saharanpur GEN 13.5114 1 0 0 0 0 0
457 Cooch Behar SC 8.73386 0 0 0 1 0 0
458 Alipurduars ST 47.4082 5 0 0 1 1 0
459 Jalpaiguri GEN 14.0959 3 0 0 1 0 0
460 Darjeeling GEN 60.2646 6 0 0 1 1 2
461 Raiganj GEN 2.52231 0 0 0 1 0 0
462 Balurghat SC 2.45793 0 0 0 1 0 0
463 Malda GEN 14.9905 0 0 0 1 0 0
464 Jangipur GEN 15.9397 0 0 0 1 0 0
465 Murshidabad GEN 8.95517 0 0 0 1 0 0
466 Berhampore GEN 7.36588 0 0 0 1 0 0
467 Krishnagar GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
468 Nabadwip SC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
469 Barasat GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
470 Basirhat GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
471 Joynagar SC 39.6246 5 0 0 1 0 0
472 Mathurapur SC 61.9453 0 0 0 1 0 0
473 Diamond Harbour GEN 24.6326 0 0 0 1 0 0
474 Jadavpur GEN 5.80609 0 0 0 1 0 0
475 Barrackpore GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
476 Dum Dum GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
477 Calcutta North West GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
478 Calcutta North East GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
479 Calcutta South GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
480 Howrah GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
481 Uluberia GEN 5.01458 0 0 0 1 0 0
482 Serampore GEN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
483 Hooghly GEN 2.78698 0 0 0 1 0 0
484 Arambagh GEN 2.96994 0 0 0 1 0 0
485 Panskura GEN 1.86111 0 0 0 1 0 0
486 Tamluk GEN 21.5477 0 0 0 1 0 0
487 Contai GEN 20.8198 0 0 0 1 0 0
488 Midnapore GEN 10.327 0 0 0 1 0 0
489 Jhargram ST 20.0133 3 0 0 1 1 0
490 Purulia GEN 45.5063 1 0 0 1 0 0
491 Bankura GEN 20.62 0 0 0 1 0 0
492 Vishnupur SC 18.5866 2 0 0 1 0 0
493 Durgapur SC 17.1363 1 0 0 1 0 0
494 Asansol GEN 22.2964 0 0 0 1 0 0
495 Burdwan GEN 7.7155 0 0 0 1 0 0
496 Katwa GEN 2.6784 0 0 0 1 0 0
497 Bolpur GEN 7.09379 0 0 0 1 0 0  
 498 Birbhum SC 9.01639 0 0 0 1 0 0
499 Surguja ST 64.2733 7 0 0 0 1 2
500 Raigarh ST 67.1391 4 0 0 0 1 1
501 Janjgir GEN 52.1541 4 0 0 0 0 0
502 Bilaspur SC 45.2963 3 0 0 0 0 0
503 Sarangarh SC 38.0503 3 0 0 0 0 0
504 Raipur GEN 10.8002 0 0 0 0 0 0
505 Mahasamund GEN 42.7043 4 0 0 0 0 0
506 Kanker ST 52.6845 9 0 0 0 1 2
507 Bastar ST 62.6934 9 0 0 0 1 2
508 Durg GEN 10.4734 0 0 0 0 0 0
509 Rajnandgaon GEN 41.5669 3 0 0 0 0 1
510 Rajmahal ST 53.5187 2 0 0 0 1 0
511 Dumka ST 32.5802 0 0 0 0 1 0
512 Godda GEN 28.2537 0 0 0 0 0 0
513 Chatra GEN 51.9686 4 0 0 0 0 1
514 Kodarma GEN 39.0282 2 0 0 0 0 1
515 Giridih GEN 59.1754 2 0 0 0 0 0
516 Dhanbad GEN 31.8536 0 0 0 0 0 0
517 Ranchi GEN 61.2472 1 0 0 0 0 0
518 Jamshedpur GEN 58.5507 3 0 0 0 0 0
519 Singhbhum ST 73.8929 5 0 0 0 1 0
520 Khunti ST 68.2576 2 0 0 0 1 1
521 Lohardaga ST 61.6411 5 0 0 0 1 1
522 Palamau SC 51.1973 3 0 0 0 0 1
523 Hazaribagh GEN 57.3861 0 0 0 0 0 1
524 Tehri Garhwal GEN 88.9891 5 0 0 0 0 0
525 Garhwal GEN 89.701 5 0 0 0 0 0
526 Almora GEN 89.5071 5 0 0 0 0 0
527 Nainital GEN 51.2621 4 0 0 0 0 0









From: Sepp, Kalev USA 
Sent: Friday, October 28, 2005 8:47 PM 
To: Mitra, John IND 




You wanted a note on "berming" in Iraq: 
 
For the first time in centuries, Mosul became a "walled city" 
again when U.S. forces pushed up an earthen berm extending completely 
around the town of 1.5 million people.  The berm is a wall of dirt six 
to eight feet high, scraped up from the barren hardpan desert beyond 
the inhabited areas, and extending continuously for dozens of miles.  
The purpose of the berm is to force all vehicle traffic to pass into 
and out of Mosul on paved roads, with traffic checkpoints set up at the 
gaps in the berm where the roads pass through it.  Since the insurgents 
and criminals use vehicles to travel, transport weapons and explosives, 
and communicate via courier (to avoid using cellphones which can be 
monitored), they must go through the checkpoints.  While the Iraqi 
police manning the checkpoints can be bribed to let a vehicle go 
uninspected -- for as little as a pack of cigarettes, but not more than 
five hundred dollars -- berming is problematic for the insurgents and 
criminal gangs.  It lengthens their time of travel, limits their 
choices of routes, and increases their risk of capture, especially if 
they're shipping weapons.  While the berm can be breached, it is not 
easy to do so, and it's obvious when it occurs.  Even if the 
infiltrators are not caught in the act of breaching by a mounted patrol 
or by aerial surveillance, their tracks are readily followed.  Berming 
was considered successful enough in Mosul that Tall Afar was bermed 
before the major coalition and Iraqi military operation in September to 
clear out the Serai neighborhood.  Samarra, long a contested town, will 
likely be bermed next. 
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